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ABSTRACT 
ENHANCING THE TIMING 
OF THE ASSET ALLOCATION PROCESS 
MAY 1990 
JOONG-SOO NAM, B.B.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, KOREA 
M.B.A., DUKE UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Ben Branch 
Much of previous research in finance has concentrated on explaining movements 
of individual securities rather than on explaining movements in the stock market 
as a whole. Although the available data are more limited than those for individual 
stocks, the movements in the stock market as a whole are extremely important for 
movements in individual stocks. Indeed, market events of the past ten years have 
sparked an interest in tactical asset allocation. The turbulence of October 1987 has 
only accelerated this interest. 
This study seeks to develop a methodology that systematically incorporates cur¬ 
rently available information into the tactical asset allocation process. The goal of this 
study is not to predict individual stock prices, or every small movement in the market. 
Rather we would like to use the currently available data to provide the investor with 
an estimate of the probabilities associated with the broad measure of either a “bullish” 
or “bearish” market period. Logit analysis is used to determine which of the various 
timely and readily available data significantly affect the probabilities of “bullish and 
vi 
“bearish” market months. We use the estimated probabilities generated by the logit 
analysis to suggest the optimal allocation of funds between the risk-free asset and the 
market portfolio and compare several timing strategies with a buy-and-hold strategy. 
An Asset allocation strategy based on the probabilities assigned by the logit model 
outperformed a buy-and-hold strategy by achieving a greater terminal wealth with 
less variability of 
reduced downside 
returns. We also find that one who used our model would have 
risk and improved average performance over past cycles. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The investment performance of a managed portfolio depends primarily on the 
manager’s ability in three areas: (1) selectivity - forecasts of price movements of 
selected individual stocks (i.e.“microforecasting”), (2) market timing - forecasts of 
price movements of the general stock market as a whole (i.e.“macroforecasting”),1 
and (3) cost and efficiency -comprehensive cost/benefit analysis of these management 
activities.2 Usually associated with security analysis, microforecasting involves the 
identification of individual stocks which are under- or overvalued relative to equities 
generally. Macroforecasting refers to forecasts of future realizations of the market 
portfolio. If an investment manager believes that he (or she)3 can forecast market 
portfolio returns better than the average participant, he will adjust his portfolio risk 
level in anticipation of market movements. If successful, he will earn abnormal returns 
relative to an appropriate benchmark. 
Much of the previous research in finance has concentrated on explaining move¬ 
ments of individual securities rather than on explaining movements in the stock mar¬ 
ket as a whole.4 One reason for this concentration of effort is that we have vast 
1Fama[51] 
2Most literature on investing deals with what (1) and when (2) to trade. How to trade at the 
lowest costs (3) is often ignored or only briefly treated [See Loeb[109]]. 
3Here in after the investor will, for the sake of convenience, be assumed to be male 
4See Treynorand Black[154], Treynor [152], Sharpe [140], and Jensen [90,91]. Jensen [92] provides 
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amounts of data on individual firms, but we have only one stock market as a whole. 
Although the available data are more limited than those for individual stocks, the 
movements in the stock market as a whole are extremely important for movements in 
individual stocks.* * * * 5 Indeed, market events of the past ten years have sparked an inter¬ 
est in tactical asset allocation.6 The turbulence of October 1987 (the disappointing 
results of portfolio insurance during the Oct. 19, 1987 market crash and the awareness 
that asset allocation may add value) has only accelerated this interest.7 
a summary of the empirical studies about microforecasting. Umstead [157] undertakes investigation 
of aggregate quarterly stock market prices. Variance bounds literature asks whether prices vary too 
much to be explained only by changes in expected cash flows [Leroy and Porter [106], Shiller [145], 
Grossman and Shiller [142]]. Some studies show that prices are predictable based on mean reverting 
[Poterba and Summers [127], Fama and French [54,56], Campbell and Shiller [27]]. 
5The statisticians need large numbers of price changes or returns as raw material for their tests. 
The number of usable separate 10-year or even 5-year return intervals in the data base are insufficient 
to constitute the statistical equivalence of a quorum. Technical innovation did occur in the early 
1980’s, however, in the form of procedures that would work with “overlapping” intervals and thus 
greatly enlarge the usable sample of long-period returns. 
definitions of the differences among tactical asset allocators, or between allocators and market 
timers, are as numerous as the firms claiming those designations. Tactical asset allocation (TAA) 
assumes that an investor can recognize and take advantage of the cyclical nature of financial markets, 
but it shares with strategic asset allocation the assumption that fundamental valuation relationships 
between asset classes hold over time. That is, the returns available in the market may be above 
or below “normal” levels at any point in time, but they will tend to revert to their norms over 
time. Market timers attempt to predict equity market peaks and troughs, using quantitative models 
with indicators such as market momentum, sentiment, price and monetary and economic conditions. 
Phillips [124] suggests that the differences between TAA and market timing can be characterized by 
five key dimensions. (1) Time frame: Market timing focus on the future. TAA focuses on current 
asset values. (2) Objective: The objective of a market timer is to maximize return. TAA is concerned 
with both risk and return. (3) Approach: The purpose of market timing is to capture market trends 
and move in or out of the market in anticipation of the trend. Although TAA recognizes cyclical 
trends in financial markets, the only prediction involved is that prices will adjust to bring returns to 
an equilibrium level established by the risk levels of the asset classes over the long term. (4) Decision: 
The market timer’s decision ultimately comes down to whether to be in or out of equities. The TAA 
decision is one of balancing asset classes, based on valuations and the constraints of the strategic 
plan. (5) Performance measurement: The market timer tries to outperform the equity market on 
a quarterly and annual basis. The TAA manager tries to outperform a global multi-asset-class 
portfolio. 
7Pension & Investment Age report that tactical asset allocation managers had $38,374 billion 
under management in the product, an increase in late 1988 of 41% from 1987 summer [Table 1.1]. 
The managers also gained 138 pension fund clients during the 12 months ended Aug. 30, bringing 
the total number of TAA clients to 838[Pension & Investment Age (Sep. 5, 1988)]. But many 
allocators underperformed in 1987 - until the crash made them look good. TAA appears to have 
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Table 1.1 Largest Tactical Asset Allocation Managers 
FIRM AMOUNT ($ mils.) 
Wells Fargo 
Prudential 
Mellon Capital 
First Chicago 
TSA 
Boston Co. 
Renaissance 
Avatar 
Citibank 
Bankers Trust 
J.P. Morgan 
Chase Investors 
Bailard Beihl & Kaiser 
Matrix 
Webster 
TOTAL 
9,127 
7,100 
6,000 
4,500 
3,000 
2.300 
1,510 
1.300 
1,250 
1,050 
500 
300 
200 
187 
50 
38,374 
SOURCE Pension & Investment Age 
3 
This study seeks to develop a methodology that systematically incorporates cur¬ 
rently available information into the tactical asset allocation process. The results of 
this procedure are then tested and evaluated. 
First, logit analysis is used to help determine which of the various current sets of 
information affect the probabilities of risk environments. Second, those probabilities 
are employed to indicate the amounts of funds to be allocated to the risk-free asset and 
to the market portfolio of risky assets. Finally, we compare several timing strategies 
with a buy-and-hold strategy. The comparison is based on end-of-period wealth 
computation, risk and return measurements. 
Chapter 2 evaluates the literature of market timing. In chapter 3, likely candidate 
variables are selected on the basis of sound theory. Such variables are expected to 
influence the risk environment of the stock market. In chapter 4, we introduce the data 
and explain the techniques. Chapter 5 discusses how to construct and validate our 
model. In chapter 6, several strategies are specified and empirical results are reported. 
Finally, a summary and directions for future research are explored in chapter 7. 
worked in 1987 and failed in 1988 [WSJ (May 16, 1989)]. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The theoretical justification for asset allocation as a portfolio management strategy 
stems from the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT). Selected literature related to the 
development of MPT is presented to provide the necessary background for the asset 
allocation strategy. Theoretical and empirical studies of performance evaluation of 
market timings are reviewed. Asset allocation techniques currently being used by 
practitioners are also examined. 
2.1 Modern Portfolio Theory 
The asset allocation decision is an integral part of the portfolio management 
process. The evaluation of portfolio management performance requires a structural 
specification within which superior performance, if it exists, can be identified. Modern 
Portfolio Theory provides a measure of performance in the framework of the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). A key contribution to MPT is the assumption that 
portfolios can be selected on the basis of expected return and risk. A major work in 
the area of the measurement of risk is the article of Markowitz [111]. He provided 
investors with the concept of the interrelationship (covariance) among individual asset 
holdings and thus emphasized the importance of all the investor’s holdings in the 
5 
portfolio format. The efficient set of portfolios is comprised of those portfolios that 
offer the maximum expected return for a given level of risk. Risk is measured by 
the variance of the portfolio returns. However, the determination of the efficient set 
of portfolios requires the computation of all of the possible variance and covariance 
terms. The number of covariance calculations can be extensive. If N securities are 
analyzed, the variance-covariance matrix will have (1/2)(N-1)N different covariance 
elements. In his 1959 article, Markowitz demonstrated that the investor’s portfolio 
decision problem could be stated in the form of a quadratic programming problem. 
The decision variable of the quadratic programming problem was shown to be the 
percentage to invest in a risky asset which minimizes variance subject to an expected 
return constraint. 
Papers following the Markowitz article further refined the development of measures 
of risk, return, and efficient sets of portfolios. Sharpe [139] extended the concepts 
of Markowitz [111], Tobin [151], Hicks [85] into a market equilibrium theory of asset 
prices under conditions of risk. Sharpe describes the optimal investment policy for 
the individual by detailing an investment opportunity curve of risky assets and the 
linear efficient set of investments resulting from the introduction of a riskless asset in 
combination with a portfolio of risky assets. He demonstrates that all investors will 
choose to hold some combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio of 
risky assets (two-fund separation). 
Sharpe extends the analysis to what is known as the CAPM by showing that the 
relevant risk measure of the individual asset is the covariance between returns of the 
risky asset and the market portfolio divided by the variance of the market portfolio. 
This risk measure, termed (3, is the risk of the economy as a whole and is therefore 
undiversifiable. In equilibrium, every individual asset must be priced so that its 
6 
risk-adjusted rate of return falls exactly on a straight line known as the Security 
Market Line. 
MPT provides the basis for the asset allocation decision through the concepts of 
the capital market line, the market portfolio, the two-fund separation theory, and the 
theory of utility maximization. Relevant measures of performance for the portfolio 
and the individual asset are described within the framework of MPT and provide 
investors with an objective criterion for selecting assets. 
2.2 Measuring Timing Performance 
Using the tools of MPT, the investment manager seeks to create a portfolio that of¬ 
fers the highest expected return in relation to risk. The process can be dichotomized 
into the activities of stock selection and asset allocation. Stock selection involves 
forecasting price movements of individual stocks (microforecasting). The investment 
manager attempts to identify those individual stocks whose expected returns lie ei¬ 
ther significantly above or below the Security Market Line. The microforecaster is 
concerned with forecasting the nonsystematic (company-specific) component of the 
return on an individual stock. Given a specific portfolio, microforecasting can be 
a valuable tool in improving its performance. However, this technique is portfolio 
specific, i.e., its results cannot be generalized so as to apply to any portfolio since 
different portfolios incorporate different stocks having different returns. 
The asset allocation decision is an attempt by the portfolio manager to forecast 
when the portfolio of risky assets will outperform the risk-free asset or when the risk¬ 
free asset will outperform the portfolio of risky assets (macroforecasting), assuming 
that the investment alternatives are limited to those two asset classes. The concept 
of macroforecasting implies a relationship between future states of the market and 
currently available information. 
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Fama [51] showed that security selection and market timing performances are 
additive if the intended beta is assumed to be equal to the actual beta. When the 
market timing performance measure is added to Jensen’s selectivity index, we arrive 
at the risk premium of the portfolio. Fama refers to this overall risk premium as total 
performance. 
Rp - Rf = [Rp - Rf - {Rm - Rf)(3P\ + (Rm - Rf)/3P 
Total perf ormance = Security selection -f Market timing 
This relationship provides a basis for measuring the security selection and market 
timing abilities of the portfolio manager simultaneously. To be meaningful, this de¬ 
composition of total performance requires that the manager be responsible for both 
security selection and market timing decisions. 
The role of the CAPM in investment performance evaluation has been widely 
debated in the finance literature. Roll [134] has argued that the CAPM cannot be 
used to produce unambiguous rankings of investment performance. His objection is 
based on several considerations. First, the market portfolio is not uniquely defined 
in the theory. Whether this portfolio should consist of only equities, all marketable 
securities or all assets, marketable or not is not clear. Second, he showed that if a 
proxy for the market portfolio is used, an alternative proxy can always be constructed 
that would give exactly the reverse ranking of performances. Third, he showed that 
if the “true” market portfolio is found and the CAPM is correct then no portfolio can 
show superior or inferior performance. 
Myers and Rice [114] have demonstrated that as long as information relevant to 
security valuation is not distributed evenly across all groups of investors, then the 
CAPM can identify superior or inferior performance. Dybvig and Ross [43,44] fur¬ 
ther clarified the circumstances under which the CAPM framework can be used for 
performance evaluation. They agree with Roll that, in the absence of consistent infor- 
8 
mation asymmetries, CAPM based performance evaluation measures are ambiguous. 
They also agree with Mayer and Rice that, in the presence of superior information not 
generally available, CAPM based performance measures can give reliable evaluations. 
In generalizing some of the findings in the Dydvig and Ross [44] paper, Green [79] 
showed that the robustness of the SML paradigm is weakened considerably if the mar¬ 
ket return proxy is not mean-variance efficient. Errors in measuring the benchmark 
market portfolio are shown to be directly related to the deviations of individual asset 
and inefficiently diversified portfolios from the SML.1 Green shows that the ranking 
of two investments using the SML based methodology can be reversed by changing 
the proxy used to measure the market portfolio. Therefore, even on a theoretical 
basis, a number of important research papers have questioned the usefulness of the 
CAPM framework for evaluating investment performance. 
Connor and Korajczyk [36] have provided a new theory and methodology for eval¬ 
uating portfolio performance using a competitive equilibrium version of the Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory (APT). Performance criteria analogous to Jensen’s abnormal returns 
measure and the Treynor-Black risk adjusted return measure are developed and con¬ 
sistent estimators derived. The APT framework developed by Connor and Korajczyk 
produces meaningful performance measures as long as the market is assumed to con¬ 
sist of both informed and uninformed investors. The APT measures which are derived 
assume that the investors or fund managers do not engage in market timing activi¬ 
ties. Therefore, while the APT model has been shown to be a useful framework for 
assessing the security selection skills of managers, further developments are needed 
so that timing activities can also be evaluated. 
1The source of this measurement error is unobserved shifts in portfolio composition that results 
in a nonnormal unconditional distribution of returns. Kane and Marks [96] consider whether such a 
measurement error is likely to occur in practice by developing the exact condition under which the 
Sharpe measure will fail to order timers according to ability. They show that the Sharpe measure is 
in fact likely to be deficient under actual market conditions, given the current industry practice of 
using quarterly data to evaluate portfolio managers. 
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A number of empirical methods have been developed to explore whether managers 
have regularly engaged in timing activities and if so, the extent to which their efforts 
have been successful. Treynor and Mazuy [155] first looked for evidence of macrofore¬ 
casting skills by analyzing return data on mutual funds. A number of papers have 
examined the intertemporal stability of mutual fund betas, thereby indirectly consid¬ 
ering the topic of market timing. Jensen [91], Campanella [24] and Pogue and Conway 
[126] investigated the stability of fund betas by correlating estimates in different time 
periods. 
Kon and Jen [103] applied a considerably more rigorous framework to the analysis 
of the timing activities of mutual fund managers. They find significant shortcomings 
when the standard ordinary least-squares technique is applied to the market timing 
problem. The technique which Kon and Jen employ is switching regression analysis. 
This approach does not require that the specific times at which the manager changes 
the volatility of the portfolio be prespecified. The other model assumes that such 
switches, if they are made at all, are made at the beginning of the prespecified bull 
and bear markets. Kon and Jen’s approach, however, does arbitrarily assume the 
number of different risk regimes used by the manager. 
In a later study, Kon [104] again used switching regression methods. The discrim¬ 
inant procedure enabled him to decide more accurately on the appropriate number 
of risk regimes to assume for a given sample of historic returns data. Aside from 
the general issue of whether managers engaged in timing activities, Kon also evalu¬ 
ated the effectiveness of the timing activities of fund managers. All of the studies 
considered thus far rely on the Capital Asset Pricing Model framework.2 
Merton [115] considered the question of market timing from an entirely new per¬ 
spective. His approach involves modeling the equilibrium value of market timing skills 
2Specifically, they assume that stock returns are normally distributed and that relative to the 
“public” information set, securities are priced so as to satisfy the SML. 
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using options. The approach requires that the market timer forecasts whether stocks 
will beat bonds/T-bills as an investment medium for the coming period. He then 
described the value of perfect accuracy using a contingent claims framework. 
Hendriksson and Merton [83] provided a sequel paper in which they added sta¬ 
tistical procedures to test for superior market timing skills within the framework de¬ 
veloped by Merton. Both parametric and non-parametric tests were presented. The 
former requires knowledge of the probability distribution of stock returns. Because 
of the difficulty in obtaining actual market forecasts of mutual fund managers, re¬ 
searchers have for the most part used the parametric test forms. Security returns are 
commonly assumed to be described adequately by the CAPM. Therefore, as applied, 
the Merton and Hendriksson tests remain CAPM based. 
The ordinary least squares methods recommended by Hendriksson and Merton [83] 
and later applied by Hendriksson [82] and Chang and Lewellen [31] are not, however, 
free of conceptual problems. If fund managers actively manage their portfolios, they 
are likely to adjust their risk levels continually in the midst of periods characterized by 
bull and bear markets. The ordinary least squares method suggested by Hendriksson 
and Merton assumes, however, that a fund’s portfolio beta is constant during any 
particular bull or bear market and common across all bull or bear periods. 
We reviewed the literature on the theory and techniques of evaluating the secu¬ 
rity selection index and market timing simultaneously. We observed that significant 
advances have been made although problems persist. As Fama [51] pointed out, the 
performance measures that are appropriate for a particular portfolio manager must 
take into account the constraints under which he operates. 
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2.3 Macroforecasting 
Empirical work in finance has traditionally concentrated on cross-sectional anal¬ 
ysis of asset returns. Several studies have, however, successfully used economic data 
to predict stock market movements, thereby suggesting the feasibility of integrating 
macroeconomic variables into the asset allocation decision.3 Umstead [157] undertook 
an extensive statistical investigation of aggregate quarterly stock prices (the S&P 500 
Composite Index) and their relationship to the National Bureau of Economic Re¬ 
search Leading Composite Index. Box-Jenkins methodology wTas utilized to build a 
transfer function model relating changes in the leading economic index to subsequent 
stock price changes. The model was verified by computing a “hit rate” of forecasts of 
“up” and “down” markets. In addition, the accumulated wealth of a portfolio that 
switched between equities and Treasury bills was compared to a buy-and-hold strat¬ 
egy. Defining “up” and “down” markets as returns above or below the median return, 
Umstead’s model made thirty-two out of fifty correct forecasts. The Umstead study 
suggested that readily available information contains enough predictive information 
to be useful to the portfolio manager in making the asset allocation decision. Note, 
however, that this effect is at least partially due to the fact that stock prices are one 
of the series that make up the Leading Composite Index. 
Manjr practitioners also asserted that combinations of publicly available informa¬ 
tion may be used to construct technical market indicators that help them assess the 
market’s mood and thus forecast its direction.4 Some academicians found value in 
the indicators,5 other studies failed to find technical stock market indicators helpful.6 
3Umstead [157], and Piccini [125] 
4Zweig [160,161] 
5Branch [15] 
6Daigler and Fielitz [38] 
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Moreover, some studies suggested that the stock market leads certain market indica¬ 
tors (e.g., money supply).7 
The efficient market hypothesis implies that predicting market returns is as diffi¬ 
cult as identifying undervalued or overvalued stocks using information that is readily 
available to all investors. Moreover, a growing body of literature suggests that prices 
deviate from value, and that such departures can be substantial and long-lasting.8 
Modigliani and Cohn maintained, in 1979, that the stock market had been 50 per 
cent undervalued for as long as a decade because of inflation illusion. The emergence 
of a bull market after inflation subsided was consistent with their hypothesis. 
Such significant and long-lasting departures from value run counter to conventional 
theory. They are more in line with the perspectives of such market observers as Shiller, 
who argues that “social movements, fashions or fads are likely to be important or even 
the dominant cause of speculative asset price movements.”9 Moreover, Summers [149] 
has pointed out that the whole litany of empirical tests supporting market efficiency 
is also consistent with an alternative “fads” hypothesis; he takes issue with the notion 
that market prices must represent rational assessments of fundamental value. 
7If investors have altered their outlook in anticipation of a change in an indicator, the stock 
market’s moves may lead (rather than be led by) those of the indicator. See Branch and Schneeweis 
[18,19] 
8The market has often appeared to depart widely from its underlying value. During the first 
three quarters of 1987, stocks outperformed bonds by 46.7 per cent. Equilibrium was practically 
restored in just one day - October 19. In the words of Summers, “If anyone did seriously believe that 
price movements are determined by changes in information about economic fundamentals, they’ve 
got to be disabused of that notion by Monday’s 500-point improvement.” [WSJ(Oct. 23, 1987)] 
While this particular market overvaluation was corrected quickly, mispricing can be longer lasting. 
9Shiller does not totally dismiss rational expectations and the usefulness of fundamentals. In his 
“Comments” in Hogarth and Reder [86], Shiller states, “I think the truth may well be that financial 
prices can be successfully modeled as reflecting proper anticipations of those future movements in 
dividends that can be predicted plus a term reflecting the anticipation of fashions or fads among 
investors.” 
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In the context of arguing that the stock market is inefficient because it is too 
volatile, Shiller [145] documented wide departures of historical prices from theoretical 
value. He cited these departures as evidence for the existence of fads.10 Fama and 
French [56] found that dividend yields can explain over 25 per cent of the variance 
in future two to four-year returns and suggested, as one possible explanation, that 
prices behave whimsically in an irrational market. 
Several studies, including those by DeBondt and Thaler [39] and Fama and French 
[56], have documented long-run reversals in security prices, which seem to be due to 
investor overreaction.11 DeBondt and Thaler [39] showed reversals lasting up to five 
years, which occurred primarily in January. Fama and French [56] demonstrated that 
up to 40 per cent of the variance of three to five year returns is a predictable reversal 
of previous returns. Others, extending these findings, have generally concluded that 
such reversals represent evidence of serious market inefficiency.12 
10But Miller and McCormick [116] argue that the case for the existence of bubbles based on the 
supposed excessive volatility of stock prices must be regarded as still unproved. The excess volatility 
argument is presented and remains controversial. For a summary of the debate, see Camerer and 
Weigelt [33]. Shiller [146] discusses departures from value, rather than excess volatility, as evidence 
of fads in “Comments”. 
nChan [29] claims that DeBondt and Thaler’s reversal effect is explained by changing risk: Stocks 
suffering price declines become riskier, and this heightened risk explains their subsequent outperfor- 
mance. However, Debondt and Thaler [40] demonstrate that losers subsequently have higher betas 
in up markets and lower betas in down markets, and thus reject the changing-risk explanation. 
12Poterba and Summers [127], O’Brien [119] and Richardson [132] argues that the seeming depar¬ 
tures from nonstationarity detected by the new procedures, properly calibrated may not really be 
larger than what might plausibly be expected from pure chance alone. A recent paper by Kim, Nel¬ 
son and Startz [100] suggests that the transitory components may be reflecting nothing more than 
the huge up-and-down swings imposed both on stock prices and the U.S. economy by the Great 
Depression of the 1930’s. They find no substantial transitory components in the 40 year postwar 
period 1946-1986. 
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How can such “mispricing” persist in the face of “smart money”? Summers [149] 
concluded that irrationality may be difficult to identify and risky to exploit, hence 
irrational prices need not be eliminated in time. Black [13] has argued that trading by 
those who do not possess useful information creates “noise”-that is, deviations of price 
from value.13 These deviations induce information-based traders to enter the market, 
but the time required for them to correct pricing errors caused by noise traders is 
often measured in months or years. As evidence from economic theory, experimental 
markets and the real world has indicated, learning, competition and arbitrage may 
be insufficient to eliminate irrationality and market inefficiencies.14 
Furthermore, institutional investors may be particularly susceptible to fads. Bern¬ 
stein [12] has suggested that value models move in and out of favor with portfolio 
managers, based on their current effectiveness. Such “style” fads might affect prices. 
Camerer and Weigelt [33] have maintained that the relative performance goal of pro¬ 
fessional money managers is conducive to price bubbles. Friedman [67] noted that the 
professional investment community shares the same research sources and suggested 
that the asymmetry of rewards in money management leads to “herd” opinions and 
decisions. In a similar vein, Treynor [153] has demonstrated that “shared errors” can 
decrease price accuracy. 
The studies reviewed thus far have implied that readily available information may 
be used (with some degree of success) to forecast stock market movements. A relevant 
question to be considered is, “How superior must one’s predictions be to implement 
a market timing style effectively?” 
13French and Roll [64] found that a significant portion of market volatility is due to mispricing. 
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers [41] maintained that noise traders cause prices to deviate so far from 
fair value as to create serious consequences for society as a whole. 
14Akelof and Yellen [1] demonstrated that small amounts of irrationality can have large economic 
effects. 
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2.4 Gains from Market Timing 
Sharpe [141] showed that a timing strategy generates higher average returns and 
less variability of those returns than a buy-and-hold portfolio. Describing the less than 
perfect timing case, Sharpe indicates that at least a seventy percent accuracy rate in 
timing the market is required to make the practice worthwhile. Because achieving 
a seventy percent accuracy rate is unlikely, Sharpe’s study suggests that portfolio 
managers minimize trading and emphasize a buy-and-hold strateg)r. Sharp’s study, 
while providing some insights into the effects of imperfect market timing ability on 
investment performance, is limited in two respects. First, Sharpe assumed an investor 
was equally successful at forecasting bull markets as bear markets. Second, Sharpe’s 
conclusions were based on the arithmetic mean of the gains over and above the returns 
from a passive buy-and-hold strategy. 
Jeffrey [89] came to the same conclusion by observing that historically more years 
had been average or poor than spectacular. Therefore, if a manager’s market timing 
activities lead him to miss a few of these rare spectacular years, he would usually 
have been better-off with a buy-and-hold strategy. 
Chua and Woodward [33] used essentially the same framework employed by Sharpe, 
but corrected for these two limitations. They tested the relative importance of hitting 
the bull markets compared with avoiding the bear markets. They show that accuracy 
in forecasting bull markets is the primary variable deciding whether timing will pay. 
They also show that the interim returns that give the stock market its high average 
return tend to occur infrequently and over a proportionately small number of periods. 
This relationship helps explain why an investor engaged in market timing activities 
has such difficulty beating a buy-and-hold strategy.15 
15The buy-and-hold strategy can be viewed as a strategy that has a 100% accuracy in forecasting 
bull markets and 0% accuracy in forecasting bear markets. 
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Using more recent data and more realistic assumptions about both the frequency 
of portfolio revisions and the level of transaction costs, Atchley and Ehrhardt [4] find 
that only a moderate degree of forecasting skill (sixty percent accuracy) is required 
to outperform the market. 
Most recently, Clarke et al. [34] show that a market timer who follows optimal 
rules can expect higher returns and lower risk than a buy-and-hold stock investor.16 
They also show that the returns on the market timer’s portfolio increases as the 
level of information increases and that even modest amount of information can bring 
substantial advantage. For example, a model that predicts monthly stock returns 
with an R2 of 0.09 can be expected to give a market timer a 5.9 percent annual 
return advantage over an investor who buys and hold stocks as presented in Table 2.1 
without incurring transaction costs.17 
2.5 Asset Allocation 
Most of these studies imply that outperforming the market on a risk-adjusted basis 
is not possible. They do, however, address the problem of developing a procedure that 
is capable of achieving an acceptably accuracy rate in predicting market conditions. 
Such a procedure should help investors determine the amount of funds to allocate to 
either the risk-free asset or the market portfolio of risky assets. 
Several techniques for making the asset allocation decision are currently available 
to the portfolio manager. Previous asset allocation studies tend to utilize allocation 
models with inputs of historical risk and return information and investor preference 
16The expected return on the portfolio of a market timer is 21.4 percent, 5.9 percent higher than 
the 15.5 return on stocks. Moreover, the standard deviation of the returns of the market timers 
portfolio is 17.2 percent, 3.3 percent lower than the standard deviation of the return of stocks. 
[Figure 2.1] 
17However, the 1.0 percent to transaction costs reduce the value added considerably, from 5.9 
percent to 1.2 percent. 
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Table 2.1 The Risk and Return of a Market Timer’s Portfolio 
Correlation0 Value6 SDC SD* 
0 % 
Value 
.1 % 
e 
1.0 %t 
0.0 0.0 20.5 20.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.1 0.0 20.5 19.4 0.5 0.2 0.0 
0.2 0.0 20.3 17.9 3.0 2.4 0.1 
0.3 0.2 19.6 17.2 5.9 5.5 1.2 
0.4 0.5 18.8 16.6 9.3 8.8 3.4 
0.5 1.1 18.1 16.3 13.0 11.9 6.4 
0.6 1.7 17.3 15.8 16.2 15.6 9.5 
0.7 2.4 16.6 15.6 19.4 19.2 12.9 
0.8 3.2 15.9 15.2 23.2 22.6 16.8 
0.9 4.0 15.3 14.8 27.3 26.4 20.0 
1.0 4.6 14.7 14.3 31.3 30.7 23.4 
“Correlation between a signal and stock returns 
6Value added by the market timer, relative to a buy and hold stock portfolio where 
switching is allowed only once a year 
cStandard deviation where switching is allowed once a year 
^Standard deviation where switching is allowed once a month 
eValue added by the market timer, relative to a buy and hold stock portfolio where 
switching is allowed once a month 
^one way transactions costs 
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constraints. Such procedures begin by examining a series of historic returns, such 
as the Ibbotson-Sinquerfield studies [87]. From these data, the portfolio manager 
calculates returns and standard deviations over various time periods relying on the 
premise that the historical relationships between risk and return will persist into the 
future. This approach is sensitive to the time period selected as a base. Moreover 
it depends upon the manager’s ability to use the historic returns by projecting the 
future state of the economy. 
Arnott and Germeten [2] presented a systematic approach to asset allocation. 
They deduced which asset classes are particularly attractive in any market condition 
by comparing the relative return estimates with “normal” relative returns. They 
found that normal relative returns amount to approximately two percent for long 
bonds and five percent for equities. They concluded that when long bond yields are 
more than two percent above cash yields, bonds subsequently do well and when the 
yield differential falls below two percent, bonds tend to perform poorly. They also 
found that trends in the relative calculated returns are just as important as the return 
calculations themselves. 
Defining peak interest rates as the difference between cash returns and the latest 
12-month percentage change in the Consumer Price Index, they found that the level 
of real interest rates is related to subsequent change in interest rates. The 12-month 
trailing rate of change in the Department of Commerce’s leading indicators was found 
to be a valuable indicator for the relative returns of equities and bonds. A rising 
indicator was shown to favor equities over bonds; a falling indicator suggests the 
opposite. They found that implementing their strategy pays off handsomely during 
turbulent markets. The amount of asset deployment has a major impact on balanced 
performance. During the less turbulent years, asset allocation is less critical. Thus 
only modest value is added during those times. 
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Fielitz and Muller [59] provided another approach to asset allocation. For ease 
of discussion, they assumed that the feasible investment environment is limited to 
fixed income securities and equities. The asset allocation system is designed to as¬ 
sist the manager in assessing the trade-off between the expected return and risk of 
the two alternative asset classes. They employed a simulation program called SIMR 
which allows the investor to isolate the effects of the four input factors: risk, return, 
time horizon, and utility preference. This study demonstrated the importance of the 
multiscenario projection approach. The approach allows portfolio managers the op¬ 
portunity to investigate a range of outcomes and the sensitivity of the asset allocation 
decision to the alternative input assumptions. They concluded with the importance of 
using probability values by stating that the values can be used to establish a bound¬ 
ary within which strategic asset allocation decisions can be made. They indicate 
the importance of assigning probabilities to the various expected returns within the 
portfolio. 
Tilley and Latainer [156] showed that the asset allocation can dynamically be 
adjusted in such a way as to replicate the returns on an option. Investing a portion 
of the portfolio in a riskless asset (to guarantee a minimum return) and dynami¬ 
cally adjusting stock and bond positions (by borrowing from the cash position), can 
eliminate all downside risk while maintaining upside potential. They linked option 
pricing theory with traditional asset allocation by utilizing a special type of option - 
a call option that gives its holder the right to purchase a full position in the better 
performance of either stocks or bonds. Their solution to the asset allocation problem 
suggests that the investor set aside enough wealth in a riskless asset to assure a mini¬ 
mum return target over the holding period and use the remaining wealth to purchase 
these specialized calls. Although such options are not available in the market place 
currently, their return pattern can be “synchronized” by a trading strategy utiliz- 
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ing stocks, bonds and cash. They didn’t explicitly consider the question concerning 
measurement of risk for such strategy. Since the payoff distribution of option based 
strategy are nonnormal, variance is no longer an adequate measure of risk. Future 
research is required to determine the proper measure of risk for a strategy involving 
options and a nonnormal payoff distribution. 
Following the rapid development of the futures contracts on US stock indices 
and Treasuries, Wall Street houses have written a substantial amount on the use 
of the contracts in the asset allocation process. The availability of the contracts 
does not solve or alter the allocation problem, but provides more efficient means of 
restructuring a portfolio. Once the decision is made to change the portfolio exposure 
to the risk of a given asset class, futures contracts provide, in most circumstances, 
the least expensive way to effect the change. Aside from tracking error between the 
cash portfolio and the futures contracts, several problems remain.18 
The studies reviewed thus far have reported some success in asset allocation. 
These studies do not necessarily imply that an appropriate asset-mix is possible to 
forecast over time. None the less, the activities of a significant portion of the asset 
allocators coupled with the evidence suggesting that value is added by these activities 
merits further academic research. 
18First, the possibility that mispricing in the interest rate and stock index contracts do not cancel. 
Excess returns to arbitrage on the S&P 500 index contract have been well-publicized recently. Excess 
returns on the T-bond contract are imperfectly correlated with the S&P raising the possibility of 
unanticipated loss or gain on the above strategy. 
Second, rolling over the hedge as contracts expire incurs pricing risks. 
Third, the possibility of cash outflow and lost interest income as contracts are marked to market 
each day. And opportunities to use futures contracts outside the USA are currently limited. 
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Tins study addresses this issue. It attempts to incorporate more information than 
previously employed and to assign probabilities to future states of the stock market 
in a more rigorous manner.*9 
19Techr.lcal marke: models :rieu to forecast the changes in stock price using decision rules with 
little or no theoretical justification. Data mining may produce indicators that seem to have some 
period specific value but out of sample results are poor. Clarke et al.34 show that a model predicting 
monthly stock returns with an correlation of 0.3 can be expected to give a market timer a 5.9 percent 
1.2 percent with 1.0 percent transactions costs annual return advantage over an investor who buys 
and holds stocks. An overestimation of the true correlation might occur if correlations, estimated 
based on past periods, do not persist into the future. A market timer who makes no allowance for 
such misestimation will make suboptimai decisions. For example, the value added by the market 
timer who has no information, but who overestimates his information as a correlation of 0.5, can 
expect to lose 8 percent per year when the one-way transaction cost is 1.0 percent. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
The objective of this study is to develop a procedure to test the merit of using 
probable states of the market as a guideline to asset allocation. The procedure is 
based on the concept that ex ante variables are related to the excess return. The 
objective is to identify the relationship and assign probabilities to expected future 
states of capital markets. The investor must be able to decide at the beginning of an 
investment period as to how he will allocate his funds across the various asset classes. 
The existing literature (cited in Chapter Two) suggests that asset allocation has 
experienced some success. An investment manager who has some information which 
permits a forecast of market movements may anticipate a market return different 
from the consensus expectation and will adjust his portfolio accordingly. When an 
investor has information that other market participants do not have regarding the 
probable future state of the stock market, the greater the confidence the investor has 
in that information the greater his tendency to allocate funds based on that knowledge 
(towards either the risk free asset or the portfolio of risky assets depending upon the 
relative performance of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio). According to the 
efficient market hypothesis, a managed portfolio would not be expected to outperform 
the buy-and-hold strategy on a risk adjusted basis over the long run. However, in the 
short run, any excess returns to a portfolio managed by a forecasting technique may 
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indicate that, although the forecaster is using readily available public information, 
the information is being processed into a form that is not being considered by all 
market participants. The implication of this process is, that as the data in that 
particular form becomes available to all investors, excess returns resulting from the 
use of that data will disappear. Recent studies demonstrating the likely existence of 
price bubbles in stock prices (cited in Chapter 2), in conjunction with the article by 
Clarke et al. [34] forms the basis for this timing of the asset allocation study. 
3.1 Procedure 
A three step procedure is used to integrate readily available variables into the as¬ 
set allocation process. The first step is to find ex ante observable variables which can 
predict excess return. The second step involves the generation of state probabilities 
from a logit analysis of the sample data. The goal is not to predict individual stock 
prices, or every small movement in the market, but rather to use the currently avail¬ 
able data to provide the investor with an estimate of the probabilities associated with 
the broad measure of either a “bullish” or “bearish” market period. Logit analysis is 
used to determine which of the various timely and readily available data significantly 
affect the probabilities of “bullish” and “bearish” market months. The final step of 
the procedure is to use the estimated probabilities generated by the logit analysis to 
suggest the optimal allocation of funds between the risk-free asset and the market 
portfolio. 
3.2 Determinants of the Excess Return 
The expected rate of return of the stock market can be decomposed into two 
components, namely, the return on a T-bill and equity risk premium (RPE). The RPE 
reflects on an ex ante basis how much additional return investors are demanding as a 
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reward for taking on the additional risk of common stock ownership. An estimate of 
RPZ oners ns a cine to the relative merits of investing in stocks versus the less risky 
medium of T-bills. Xote. however, that we never really know ex ante what RPE is or 
how it is changing. At best we can estimate its size and direction of movement. 
Here, we shall ask whether any ex ante observable variables reliably predict excess 
return Excess return can be written as follows: 
ExcessReturn = T otal Return — RiskFreeReturn 
ER, = P‘ - P‘-1 - D‘ _ TBt (3.1) 
M-l 
This market excess return provides a measure of the attractiveness of stocks rel¬ 
ative to the risk-free rate. Hence it offers a guideline for allocating assets between 
stocks and cash. 
Consider a discrete-time perfect-certainty model in which Dt, the dividend per 
share for the time period from t-1 to t. grows at the constant rate g, and the market 
interest rate that relates the stream of future dividends to the stock price Pf_x at 
time t-1 is the constant k. In this model, the price Pt-1 is 
Pt-1 = 
1 + g + (.i±£l! + ,,.) = Dt 
1 + kK 1 + k (1 + k)2 ' k — g 
We can restate equation (3.1) into equation (3.3) using equation (3.2). 
ERl = AA/(*-g) + A _ TBt 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
Dt/{k - g) 
While the form of equation (3.3) does not lend itself to empirical estimation, it 
does provide the theoretical foundation for the hypothesis represented by equation 
(34).1 
1Much has been written on the performance of stocks stratified by PEs and another body of 
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ER = f[k,g,D,TB} (3.4) 
3.2.1 Determinants of Appropriate Discount Rate 
An investor’s required rate of return is determined by: (1) the economy’s risk-free 
rate (RFR), sometimes referred to as the pure time value of money, (2) the expected 
rate of price increase during the period of the investment, and (3) a risk premium for 
common stocks that reflects investor uncertainty regarding future returns. 
The ‘Teal” risk-free rate is generally considered to be a function of the “real” 
growth rate of the economy, which in turn is determined by the growth of productivity. 
The nominal RFR is the “real” RFR plus the expected rate of inflation during the 
period. While the real RFR is difficult to derive, a reasonable proxy for the real RFR 
is the yield on U.S. government securities. We use the U.S. government yield series 
as a proxy for the nominal RFR and adjust it for the rate of inflation to derive an 
estimate for the “real” RFR. Given the adjustment to derive an estimate of the “real” 
RFR, we wish to consider whether the expected rate of inflation has any independent 
impact. 
literature seeks to explain the level of a firm’s PE ratio. The market PE has, in contrast, received 
relatively little academic attention. Note, however, that the market is simply an aggregation of 
individual stocks. Accordingly, equation (3.2) should be applicable to the total market. In fact, 
equation (3.2) may be more suitably applied to the market as a whole than to individual stocks. 
Errors in measuring inputs may well tend to cancel out in the aggregate. That is, overestimates 
of individual dividend forecasts are likely to be offset by underestimates. Thus the DDM can be 
used to examine how the stock market is viewing the future. Branch [17] suggests that Dividend 
Discount Model could have been helpful in the economic analysis of the overall stock market around 
the time of the stock market crash of 1987. Showing that the market’s growth expectations were very 
different just before the crash than they had been a year earlier, he suggests that the growth rate, in 
conjunction with consideration of a PE ratio might be a useful indicator of market signal. Francis 
[63] argued that the simplified nature of the dividend discount model could lead to conclusions which 
are true for the model but not true in general. [See Francis [63] pp. 239-256]. Chen, Roll and Ross 
[32] and Keim and Stambaugh [98] utilize equation (3.2) to suggest that the factors contributing to 
stock-price variability can be reviewed either as factors that change expected cash flows or as factors 
that change discount rates. 
27 
We shall consider the default spread as ex ante yield variables to forecast the 
excess stock returns. We use the difference between the yield on a long term below 
Baa rated corporate bond portfolio and the yield on a long term Aaa rated bond 
portfolio to represent the default spread. 
Previous evidence of ex ante variables that predict risk premiums is confined pri¬ 
marily to specific types of assets and specific time periods. For example, a number 
of researchers have found that excess returns on common stocks are negatively corre¬ 
lated with measures of expected inflation during the post-1953 period, but this result 
does not generalize to other types of assets or to other subperiods.2 What we lack is 
evidence that one or several variables consistently predict risk premiums over a long 
period. 
The finance profession appears to believe that expected returns fluctuate through 
time as well as across stocks. These results are interpreted as describing the time 
variation in the “risk premium.” 
A bit of casual empiricism suggests that fashions and fads in investor attitudes 
cause stocks (groups or the entire market) to be at times overpriced, and at other 
times underpriced. Moreover, each of these fads eventually comes to an end. Such 
behavior would lead us to expect a high return when stock prices are low relative 
to dividends (or earnings or some other variable whose importance varies with the 
fashion of the day) and expect a low return when stock prices are high relative to 
dividends (or earnings). This type of relationship would imply that the following 
naive investment strategy should pay off: buy when price is low relative to dividends 
or earnings and sell when it is high. 
2See, for example, Jafle and Mandelker [88] and Fama and Schwert [58]. The negative correlation 
is particularly strong when the measure of expected inflation is simply the Treasury bill yield, but 
the phenomenon is evidently confined to the post-1953 period. Indeed, Fama [52] argues that the 
observed correlation is spurious. 
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That stock returns exhibit a peculiar seasonal pattern is now well known.3 Those 
who have studied the issue generally have found that, on average, January returns are 
significantly higher than the returns for other months. Several studies have examined 
seasonality in risk premiums.4 Tinic and West [150] examined the risk premiums of 
the two-parameter CAPM. They observed the previously reported seasonality and 
high January premium. They also found that January is the only month having 
a consistently positive, statistically significant relationship between expected return 
and risk. Recently, using the two-stage procedure with the maximum-likelihood factor 
analysis, Gultekin and Gultekin [81] show that the risk premia of the APT tend to 
be significant only in January. 
In view of the above studies, we shall check for any seasonal patterns in excess 
returns of aggregate market. These considerations suggest the discount rate (k) model 
shown at equation (3.5). 
k = f[DS, EI(orU7), D/P{orE/P), JS] (3.5) 
where; 
DS: the default spread 
El (or UI): the expected inflation rate (or the unexpected inflation rate) 
D/P (or E/P): the dividend-price ratio (or the earnings-price ratio) 
JS: the seasonality dummy 
3Branch [16], Reinganum [130], DeBondt and Thaler [39] and Gultekin and Gultekin [81]. Fol¬ 
lowing Branch [16], many authors have suggested tax-loss selling as an explanation of the January 
seasonal. 
4RozefF and Kinney [137] found that seasonality appeared in the risk premiums obtained from a * 
two-parameter CAPM and that January displayed a relatively large risk premium compared with 
the other months. Keim [97] also found seasonality in the risk premiums. 
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Default Spread 
We plan to use the default spread as ex ante yield variables to forecast the ex¬ 
cess stock returns. The difference between the yields on long-term below Baa rated 
corporate bonds and the yield on the highest grade (Aaa) bond portfolio is used to 
reflect the market implied default spread. 
The default spread represents a direct measure of the degree of risk aversion im¬ 
plicit in pricing. "We hope that default spread would reflect much of the unanticipated 
movement in the degree of risk aversion and in the level of risk implicit in the market’s 
pricing of stocks. This ex ante yield variable, which reflects the level of low-grade 
bond prices (relative to promised payments), shares its motivation with another bond 
market variable proposed by Chen, Roll and Ross [32' and Keim and Stambaugh [98 . 
Chen, Roll and Ross [32 examined the correlation between stock returns and the 
contemporaneous (ex post) difference between returns on low-grade bonds and U.S. 
Government bonds. They argued that changes in the relative prices of low-grade 
bonds proxy for changes in expected risk premiums. They found that stock returns 
are positively correlated with the contemporaneous bond return spread. This result 
is consistent with an increase in expected risk premiums (low bond return spread) 
accompanying a decrease in the stock price (low stock return). Sharing the motivation 
with Chen, Roll and Ross ;32], Keim and Stambaugh [98] used the difference between 
yields on long-term below BAA rated (low-grade) corporate bonds and short-term 
(approximately one-month) U.S. Treasury bills as an ex ante yield variable to forecast 
stock returns. 
Most recently, Fama and French [55] show that predictable variations in bond and 
stock returns is, in addition to the dividend yields, tracked by measures of default 
30 
and term premia in expected returns.5 Their results show that the default spread is 
clear a business-cycle variables.6 
The low-grade bond return series is for nonconvertible corporate bonds, and it 
is obtained from Ibbotson Associates [87] for the period prior to 1986. A detailed 
description of the sample is contained in Ibbotson Associates [87]. The low-grade 
series is extended through 1987 by choosing 10 bonds whose ratings were below Baa. 
Inflation Rate 
According to most financial theories, expected inflation should be the basic un¬ 
derlying influence in asset pricing. It tends to affect both the expected cash flows and 
the discount rate. 
Expected cash flows change because of both real and nominal forces. Changes 
in the expected rate of inflation would influence nominal expected cash flows as well 
as the nominal rate of interest. To the extent that assets are priced in real terms, 
unanticipated price-level changes will have a systematic effect on both pricing and 
expected returns. Moreover, to the extent that relative prices change along with 
5The default-premium variable (called the default spread) is the difference between the yield on 
a proxy for the market portfolio of corporate bonds and the yield on the highest grade (Aaa) bond 
portfolio. At the end of September 1987, the default spread (measured as the spread of Baa yields 
over Aaa yields) was .27 % (27 basis points), about half its mean value (.55 %) for the 1957-86 
period. The default spread rose sharply around October 19th, and at the end of 1987, the spread, 
at .50 %, was still below but close to its 1957-86 mean [See Fama [53]]. 
6As such those variables are high when business is poor and low when the economy is strong. 
They interpret these results as follows: business conditions are poor, wealth is low and expected 
returns on stocks must be high to induce substitution from consumption to investment. Conversely, 
when times are good and wealth is high, the market clears at lower levels of equilibrium expected 
returns. Variation in expected returns over the business cycle may also be due to variation in the 
risk of stocks. The fact that the default spread signals variations in expected stock returns suggests 
that the spread is better interpreted as a general proxy for business conditions rather than as a 
simple measure of default risk. 
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general inflation, asset valuation changes are associated with changes in the average 
inflation rate. 
Early empirical work indicates a significant negative relation between inflation 
and stock prices7 Fama and Schwert [58] used expected and unanticipated inflation 
as well as changes in expectations as explanatory variables. They found a consistent 
negative relation between stock returns and each of these three variables. Fama [52] 
claimed that the negative stock-inflation relations are induced by negative relations 
between inflation and real activity which in turn are explained by a combination 
of money demand and the quantity theory of money.8 Similarly Geske and Roll 
[69] have developed and tested a model that explains the negative relation between 
stock returns and inflation as due to rational investors realizing the adverse impact 
of inflation on future economic policy. 
Unanticipated inflation is defined as 
UIt = It- EIt, (3.6) 
where I(t) is the realized monthly first difference in the logarithm of the Consumer 
Price Index for period t. The series of expected inflation, EIt is obtained from Fama 
and Gibbons’ interest rate model [66]. 
If ERt-i denotes an expected real return for month and EIt-1 denotes an expected 
inflation rate, then Fisher’s equation asserts that 
TBt-i = ERt-i + EIt-1. (3.7) 
Hence, TBt~\ — It measures the ex post real return on Treasury bills in the period. 
From a time-series analysis of this variable, Fama and Gibbons [66] constructed a 
7Lintner [108], Jaffe and Mandelker [88] and Fama and Schwert [58] found a negative relation 
between stock returns and both expected and unanticipated inflation. 
8Both Fama’s theoretical model and empirical tests seem to support his contention that the 
observed simple stock market/inflation results from the proxy effects of an underspecified model. 
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time series for EIt-Our expected inflation variable is defined by subtracting their 
time series for the expected real rate from the TBt-1 series.9 
Dividend-Price Ratio 
Most previous studies of the dividend-price ratio have been concerned with the 
cross-sectional relationship between dividend-price ratios and average returns. The 
ability of the dividend-price ratio to predict returns has, however, been noted by 
several authors.10 
From equation (3.2), the dividend yield is the interest rate less the dividend growth 
rate in dividends, 
Dt 
- = k-g. (3.8) 
“t-1 
In the certainty model, the interest rate k is the discount rate for dividends and 
the period-by-period return for the stock.* 11 The direct relation between the dividend 
yield and the interest rate in the certainty model (3.8) suffices, however, to illustrate 
that yields are likely to capture variation in expected returns. The intuition of the 
hypothesis that dividend yields forecast returns is as follows: stock prices are low 
relative to dividends when discount rates and expected returns are high, and vice 
versa. Thus yields capture variation in expected returns. A similar intuition applies 
for the earnings-price ratio (E/P). 
9If positive (negative) stock returns are associated with negative (positive) changes in the real 
interest rate, stock returns may be negatively correlated with changes in the Treasury bill rate, 
the proxy for expected inflation, even when stock returns and inflation are not directly related. 
A change in the real rate of interest should be a true cause of ex post stock returns, because an 
increase (decrease) in the real interest rate induces a reduction (increase) in all asset values. Thus, 
the beginning-of-period T-bill rate’s real interest component and the subsequent expected stock 
returns may be positively related. 
10Shiller [146] and Flood, Hodrick, and Kaplan [61] 
11 The transition from certainty to a model that (a) accommodates uncertain future dividends 
and discount rates and (b) shows that the correspondence between discount rates and time-varying 
expected returns is difficult [See Campbell and Shiller [26] and Poterba and Summers [127]]. 
33 
The efficient market hypothesis has been traditionally associated with the asser¬ 
tion that future price changes are unpredictable. Many early observers of financial 
markets, however, believed that security prices could diverge from their fundamen¬ 
tal values.12 More recently, the idea that fashions and fads in investor attitudes 
(or other types of systematic “irrationality”) may affect stock prices has gained new 
respectability.13 
However, so long as prices have any tendency to gravitate back to fundamen¬ 
tals, they will be mean-reverting over long horizons. That is, they are somewhat 
predictable and not a random walk. In particular, if one takes a long-term perspec¬ 
tive, then stock returns display significant negative serial correlation. In other words, 
prices are mean reverting.14 The proposition that prices are mean reverting implies 
that prices are predictable. 
Rozeff [136] showed that the equity risk premium can be proxied by the prospec¬ 
tive dividend yield based on the Golden Rule of Accumulation in the context of the 
Gordon growth Model.15 He defines the equity risk premium as the required return 
on equity minus the riskless rate of interest. He then converts real growth and the 
real riskless interest rate into nominal values by adding the expected inflation rate to 
12 For example Keynes [99] 
13See Chapter Two, Shiller [146], De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann [41], and Shefrin 
and Statman [142] investigated economies with both rational “information” traders and irrational 
“noise” traders. In a world populated by noise traders, rational traders do not necessarily dominate 
the market nor do noise traders become extinct, even in the long run. Also, prices do not necessarily 
equal intrinsic value. 
140ne type of mean reversion in cross-sectional stock prices has been discussed in the literature 
at least since the time of Graham [72]. Modern empirical work suggests that simple contrarian 
strategies do yield excess returns [Basu [7]]. Substantial evidence in the psychology literature imply 
that individuals tend to overweight recent data in making forecasts and judgements [Kahneman 
and Tversky [95]]. Shiller [146] argues that mass psychology may well be the dominant cause of 
movements in the price of the aggregate stock market. If this behavior is manifest in financial 
markets, then we should observe mean-reverting returns to stocks that have experienced extremely 
good or poor returns over the past few years. 
15If the economy maximizes consumption per capita, then the rate of growth of output equals the 
physical marginal productivity of capital, which in turn equals the rate of interest. 
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each. Essentially a Fisher effect adjustment is applied to both variables. When he 
subtracts the riskless rate from both sides of the Gordon growth model, he derives 
his equation.16 
risk premium = A(l+g) 
P 
+ (G + I) — (R + I) (3.10) 
where D is the current dividend level, I is the expected rate of inflation, g is the 
nominal rate of growth in dividends, G is the real rate of growth in dividends, P is 
the price of the stock, R is the real riskless rate of interest. 
Invoking the Golden Rule of Accumulation17, the above expression can be simpli¬ 
fied to his equation (3.11 ):18 E 
D( 1 + r) , 
risk premium = - (3.11) 
where r(the nominal riskless rate) has replaced g in the dividend yield formulation, 
due to their assumed equality. Since (D x r) tends to be small compared to D, the 
equity risk premium approximately equals the current dividend yield on stocks. 
Using annual data, he shows that the stock return earned in the following years 
rises as the dividend yield in the prior year increases. His results imply that high 
16The expected rate of return on the stock market is equal to the dividend yield variable on the 
market plus the anticipated growth rate of dividend, (D-r g), therefore, 
risk premium = +,-(* + !) = SiL±A + (g+/)-(«+/) 
P P 
(3.9) 
17the growth rate of physical output equals the real rate of interest in an equilibrium in which 
consumption per capita is maximized 
18Johnson [93] showed that Rozeff’s results holds only for (1) long time periods, as opposed to 
individual years, (2) the aggregate stock market, as opposed to an individual firm’s equity. 
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returns tend to occur when the environment is perceived to be so risky that investors 
demand a high premium for holding stocks and low returns tend to occur when the 
environment is perceived to hold such modest risk that investors demand a low risk 
premium for holding stocks.19 
Most recently, Fama and French [54,56] use regressions of returns on dividend 
yields to track expected returns. As in earlier works, these regressions explain small 
fractions of monthly and quarterly return variances. But excess of 30% of variances 
are commonly explained for return horizons (holding periods) beyond a year.20 
Campbell and Shiller [27] use the dividend-price ratio model to compute the impli¬ 
cations of this predictability for the behavior of the dividend-price ratio. They utilize 
the vector autoregressive methods(VAR) finding that the lagged log dividend-price 
ratio has a positive relation to stock returns. Thus the dividend-price ratio appears to 
be an appropriate candidate for explaining the risk environment of the stock market 
over time. We plan to use yields based on annual dividends to avoid seasonals in 
dividends. 
Earnings-Price Ratio 
Earnings data are appropriate candidate variables for forecasting stock returns. A 
similar intuition can be applied for the earnings-price ratio as for the dividend-price 
19At the end of September 1987, the dividend/price ratio for the S&P 500 was 2.78 %, compared to 
its average value for the 1957-86 period of about 3.8 %. At the end of December, the dividend/price 
ratio for the S&P 500 was 3.71 %, still below but not far from its mean, 3.8 %, for the last 30 years 
[See Fama [53]]. 
20Suppose shocks to expected returns and shocks to rational forecasts of dividends are independent. 
Then the cumulative effect of a shock on expected returns must be exactly offset by an opposite 
adjustment in the current price. It follows that mean-reverting equilibrium expected returns can give 
rise to mean-reverting (temporary) components of stock prices [See Poterbaand Summers [127]]. On 
the other hand, temporary components of prices and the forecast power of yields are also consistent 
with common models of an inefficient market, in which stock prices take long temporary swings 
away from fundamental values [cited in chapter Two]. In this view, high dividend-price ratios signal 
that future returns will be high because stock prices are temporarily irrationally low. Conversely, 
low dividend-ratios signal irrationally high prices and low future returns. 
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ratio. The notion underlying such propositions is that if stocks are underpriced 
relative to fundamental value (high E/P), subsequent returns tend to be high; the 
converse holds if stocks are overpriced. 
The ratio of earnings to market price reflects the investment community’s degree 
of optimism or pessimism regarding the outlook for future earnings. The earnings- 
price ratio theoretically expresses a market discount rate that serves as a positive and 
straight-forward contribution to the stock return. Many empirical studies support the 
hypothesis that ex post stock returns correlate positively with ex ante earnings-price 
ratios.21 
Recently, Campbell and Shiller [27] show that the earnings-price ratio is a powerful 
predictor of the returns and excess returns on stocks, particularly when the return is 
measured over several years. Sorensen and Arnott [147] show that the equity market 
risk premium based on earnings yield has a 26% correlation with the one-month equity 
market excess return. 
The economic cycle may impair the effectiveness of the simple earnings- price ratio 
based model. Specifically, reported earnings may be overstated during an economic 
boom and understated during recession, leading to an overestimation of the stock 
market’s attractiveness during a boom and an understated appeal during a recession. 
21 Most studies conclude that stocks with high earnings-price ratios tend to have superior returns; 
see Basu [7], Cook and Rozeff [36]. Whether stocks with a high earnings-price ratio will have a 
relatively high return has been the subject of much discussion in the literature. Simple correlation 
across firms has been found between such ratios and returns. Basu [7] concluded that risk-adjusted 
returns are positively correlated with the earnings-price ratio even after controlling for firm size. As 
Basu notes, however, his tests depend on the risk measurement assumed. Elgers, Callahan and Strock 
[48] claimed that Basu’s findings were due to (1) a classification bias inherent in the market index 
earnings expectation model used, and (2) failure of the returns conditioning model to incorporate 
a share price effect on security returns. They showed empirically that when a suitable model for 
expected earnings is used and the influence of share price upon security returns is controlled for, 
earnings yields are unrelated to the unexpected earnings-security association. 
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By using a long-term average of earnings, we smooth out the impact of valuation 
errors that occur because of peak earnings or depressed earnings. Accordingly, a 3- 
yeai double exponential moving average of earnings is used to give the greatest weight 
to the more recent observation.22 
Thus we believe that the earnings-price ratios is a possible candidate for explaining 
the risk environment of the stock market over time. 
Excess Return Seasonality 
Many researchers document stock market anomalies that challenge the efficient 
markets hypothesis. While the existence of seasonal patterns is difficult to contest, 
the cause of such patterns is much in dispute. 
One explanation offered by Branch [16] and Dvl [45] for the January seasonal 
suggests that tax-loss selling pressures in December temporarily drive security prices 
below their equilibrium levels and cause abnormal gains in January when incentives to 
sell for tax purposes are gone.23. A second explanation for the January seasonal is that 
macroeconomic forces that help determine security returns follow a seasonal pattern 
themselves. This argument is implicit in Chan, Chen, and Hsieh’s [30] attempt to 
eliminate the January stock seasonal by examining return residuals from a multifactor 
model in which each factor was a macroeconomic variable. 
22The use of an average of earnings in computing the earnings-price ratio has a long history. 
Graham and Dodd [73' recommended an approach that “shifts the original point of departure, 
or basis of computation, from the current earnings to the average earnings, which should cover a 
period of not less than five years, and preferably seven to ten years.” Exponential moving average 
of earnings will slowly forget the relevance of past data. 
23Branch [16], Dyl [45], Reinganum [130] 
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To date. no angle explanation accounts totally for the observed stock market 
seasonal* Nor do we attempt to provide such an explanation here. We plan to check 
for any seasonal patterns in excess returns of the aggregate stock market. 
3.2.2 Determinants of the Appropriate Growth Rate 
The expected mean growth rate of earnings, g, is a function of both short and 
long-term factors. We assume that over the long-run profits represent a relatively 
constant percentage of GXP. Thus the economy's long-term growth rate in output 
should approximate the long-term growth rate in corporate earnings. And thus, 
with an approximately constant payout rate, also be equivalent to the long-term 
growth rate for dividends. Such forces as the rates of technological change, capital 
accumulation and population growth largely determine the long-term trend in the 
economy. Such factors should be sufficiently stable to produce a relatively constant 
long term trend. Most fluctuations in stock prices are, however, a reaction to shorter 
term changes. The actual growth rate, g. will vary from its long term trend as a 
result of two basic factors: (1) where the economy is relative to its trend line value 
and (2) how stimulative or restrictive an economic policy is pursued. 
An economy that is producing goods and services at well below its potential 
rate can. in the short run. expand much more rapidly than can an economy that is 
operating close to capacity. A rapidly expanding economy will tend to produce even 
more rapidly growing earnings because initially at least, revenues tend to increase 
much faster than capacity. Thus so called “fixed costs’ are spread over an ever 
larger revenue base thereby allowing price-cost margins to expand. The process works 
in reverse for a contracting economy: profits fall proportionately more than sales. 
Realizing these relationships, the market expects the economy to generate rapidly 
growing (declining) profits once it begins to emerge from (go into) a recession. The 
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position of the economy relative to the long term trend in capacity can be measured 
by the level of industrial production activity. 
Some evidence suggests that an ability to foresee business cycle turning points 
for several months ahead improves the ability to foresee major turning points in the 
general level of stock prices.24 The evidence does not imply that every bear market 
must be accompanied by an economic recession or vice versa. However, stock prices 
have evidenced a pronounced tendency to decline prior to an economic downturn. 
Accordingly, if a recession or a slowdown of economic growth appears to lie ahead, 
the odds are high that it will be preceded by a significant stock market downturn 
some months in advance.25 
If we can forecast business cycles earlier and/or more accurately than the market 
and allocate funds accordingly, we can avoid the recession induced drop in the market 
portfolio and outperform the market during a recession. 
We quantify the degree to which investors are out of step using the implied market 
growth rate from equation (3.2). Such a mispricing creates attractive relative valua¬ 
tion opportunities involving stocks and cash. We also plan to use a direct measure of 
actual growth in earnings per share during alternative past periods. 
Putting the above factors together we have; 
g = f[G,AIP,CI,UI(arEI)] (3.12) 
where; 
G: the implied market growth rate 
s 
A IP: the changes in the industrial production, 
Cl: the cycle indicator, 
UI (or El): the unexpected inflation rate (or the expected inflation rate), and 
24Umstead [157] 
25For example, Piccini [125] concluded that the best time to sell stocks is probably one to three 
months before a recession begins. 
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Industrial Production 
Changes in the expected level of real production would affect the current real 
value of cash flows. Insofar as the risk-premium measure does not capture industrial 
production uncertainty, the changes in the rate of productive activity should have an 
influence on stock returns through their impact on cash flows. 
The basic series is the growth rate in U.S. industrial production which was ob¬ 
tained from the Survey of Current Business. If IPt denotes the rate of industrial 
production in month t, then the monthly growth rate is 
AIPt = log IPt - log I(3.13) 
Implied Growth Rate 
Equation (3.2) provides a means for developing explicit return estimates for both 
individual stocks as well as the aggregate market. Transforming equation (3.2) to 
solve for the implied growth rate, g yields the following: 
(3.14) 
We can convert equation (3.14) into a real implied growth rate, g\ by subtracting an 
inflation rate, I, from the nominal implied growth rate, g: 
g' = k-j-I (3.15) 
Note that the real implied growth rate (g') is equal to the appropriate required rate of 
return (k) minus the dividend-price ratio and the inflation rate. Thus with estimates 
for k, D/P and I (appropriate required rate of return, dividend yield, the expected 
inflation rate) we can solve for the implied market expected real growth rate in div¬ 
idends, g\ and the degree to which the implied market expected real growth rate in 
dividends are out of step from the average market growth rate in the past, g — g . 
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"While these proxies are imperfect, they are probably reasonably close to the market’s 
acttial expectations. Hopefully imperfections in the proxies do not lead to system¬ 
atic errors over the time of this analysis. Since the expected growth of the economy 
has ramifications for stock investing, a reliable model of the expected growth might 
provide a useful benchmark that could help one forecast the market risk environment. 
Rather than examining indirect measures of growth rates in earnings, we also use 
a direct measure of actual growth rate in earnings per share during alternative past 
periods. These growth rates are similar to the variables used in past studies.26 For 
each month, a yearly average of the prior twelve months is derived and then computed 
the percentage change during the last year. Average growth rates are derived for one- 
and three-year periods by computing the average percent change for each interval on 
a moving basis. 
Cycle Indicators 
Picdni 125 explores the relationship between stock market movements and busi¬ 
ness cycles. He shows that the investor should sell stocks one to three months before 
a recession begins rather than wait until a clear indication of a recession is present.27 
Previous studies have found that composite indicators are able to predict (with errors) 
business cycles.28 
26Malkiel and Cragg [117] 
2’Because the averages have moved over a fairly narrow range prior to cyclical peaks, investors 
would probably do nearly as well by selling eight months before the peak in economic activity. Cau¬ 
tious investors should probably wait at least six months into a recession before the} start reacquiring 
stocks. 
28Umstead 157] 
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The search for leading, coincident and lagging indicators of general economic ac¬ 
tivity has been one of the major continuing projects of the National Bureau of Eco¬ 
nomic Research (NBER). Business Conditions Digest classifies indicators by their 
participation in the stage of economic process and their relationship to business cycle 
movements. 
Moore and Zarnowitz [159] show that early and confirming signals of business 
cycle peaks and troughs are produced sequentially on a current basis by a system 
of monitoring smoothed rates of change in the composite indexes of leading and 
coincident indicators.29 
We believe that a ratio of coincident to lagging indicators may offer better timing 
signals, at least for those cycles in which stocks led the way and business followed 
and the lagging indicators contain series such as interest rates, unit costs of output, 
etc., and a rise in these factors operates to brake a rise in business and profits alike.30 
29The expected sequence of signals at business cycle peaks, then, is when each of the following 
conditions is first observed: First signal (PI): The leading index falls below 3.3%, while the coinci¬ 
dent index rate is positive (L < 3.3; C > 0 ). Second signal (P2): The leading index rate becomes 
negative, and the coincident index rate falls below 3.3% (L < 0; C < 3.3 ). Third signal (P3): Both 
the leading index rate and the coincident rate become negative ( L < 0; C < 0). At business cycle 
troughs, the signals they have selected are slightly different, occurring when each of the following 
conditions is first observed: First signal (Tl): the leading index rate rises above zero, while the 
coincident index rate is negative (L > 0; C < 0). Second signal (T2): The leading index rate rises 
above 3.3%, and the coincident index rate rises above zero ( L > 3.3; C > 0). Third signal (T3): 
Both the leading index rate and the coincident index rate exceed 3.3% (L > 3.3; C > 3.3). 
30 Wall Street Journal editor Malabre also seem convinced that this ratio gives earlier warning of 
turns in business than do the leading indicators.[WSJ, Feb. 14, 1978] The ratio of the coincident 
index to the lagging index contains information that is related to stock market activity. Coincident 
indicators historically reach their turning points at about the same time as the general economy. 
Lagging indicators reach their peaks and troughs at a time later than the corresponding business 
cycle turns. The index of four roughly coincident indicators is composed of (1) number of employees 
on non-agricultural payrolls, (2) index of industrial production, (3) personal income, less transfer 
payments, (4) manufacturing and trade sales. The index of 6 roughly lagging indicators is composed 
of (1) index of labor costs, (2) manufacturing and trade inventories, (3) commercial and industrial 
loans outstanding, (4) average duration of unemployment in weeks, (5) ratio, consumer installment 
credit to personal income, (6) average prime rate charged by banks. A composite of the coincident 
and lagging indicators may provide information that is useful in predicting stock market condition. 
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In contrast to using some business cycle indicators, we shall also consider some 
direct measure of the stock market cycle. Technical analysts frequently follow the 
trends of moving averages, comparing them to the trend of the current data. This 
approach provides them with a trading signal. When current prices are rising and 
the current price rises above the moving average, technical analysts see a buy signal; 
when current prices are falling and the current price falls below the moving average, it 
is a sell signal. For example, at market tops, when prices have been rising, the current 
price will be above the moving average since the moving average is being pulled along 
behind. When a downtrend in prices begins, current prices will fall more rapidly than 
the moving average, and eventually they will cut through the trailing moving average. 
This is a signal that the market has started to turn down. Technical analysts view 
this as the time to sell. The opposite scenario occurs at market bottoms. 
Moving average trading systems are trend-following systems. That is, they signal a 
move in the market after the trend has changed. Thus, such systems are not expected 
to get an investor into the market at the exact bottom or out at the exact top. Rather, 
the systems are designed to keep an investor on the right side of the market for the 
longer trends. The longer the moving average, the slower the indicator is to signal a 
change in trend. But a longer moving average also provides fewer false signals. We 
plan to include 7-month S&P 500 moving average, (or exponential moving average)31 
The following variables are initial candidates to predict business cycles. 
1. Ratio, Coincident Composite Index to Lagging Composite Index 
2. 7-month S&P 500 moving average 
3. Criteria from Moore and Zarnowitz 
31 “200-day moving average” has been recommended by many authors. See Remaley [129], and 
WSJ [May 12, 1989] 
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3.2.3 Determinants of the Dividends 
Earnings represent a useful summary of the available information about the future 
cash flows from an equity investment. Stock valuation models commonly employ 
some measure of earnings as their major parameter. Earnings per share emerge 
from various studies as the single most important accounting variable in the eye of 
investors. A substantial body of research has dealt with the information content of 
earnings numbers. The main findings is that earnings are correlated with factors that 
determine prices.32 
Virtually everyone agrees that the prices of investments are largely determined by 
their expected cash flows. Thus knowledge of the average value of these expectations 
should already be incorporated in the price, and buying on the basis of average 
expectations should not lead to excess returns. Few people need to be convinced that 
expectations play an important role in determining prices. Accordingly, one should 
be able to earn larger excess returns by knowing (at least directional) the error in 
the earnings forecasts. Investment in a period with high actual earnings should not 
necessarily lead to excess returns unless the market was forecasting low earnings. 
Therefore, knowledge concerning differences between actual earnings and forecasted 
earnings (unexpected earnings) should lead to higher excess returns than knowledge 
concerning actual earnings itself. Thus, an unanticipated change in earnings causes 
a predictable change in the next period’s dividends. 
We have; 
D = f[EF(orU E)\ (3.16) 
32Ball and Brown [5] and Beaver, Lambert, and Morse [8] 
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where; 
EF (or UE): the earnings forecasts (or the unexpected earnings) 
Recently, earnings expectational data have become more available. Accordingly, 
more attention has been directed toward the examination of the properties of ana¬ 
lysts forecasts of earnings, the information content of these forecasts, and the manner 
by which earnings forecast revisions impact security prices. These studies find that 
revisions in analysts’ forecasts of earnings stir market reaction. Furthermore, infor¬ 
mation on these revisions may be used to construct profitable investment strategies.33 
That is, financial analysts’ forecasts are, to a degree, a leading indicator of individual 
securities’ price change. Numerous studies, starting with Ball and Brown [5], also 
documented a relation between ex post unexpected earnings and ex post unexpected 
stock returns.34 
Examination of the association between unexpected earnings and security returns 
requires a suitable measure of the market’s expectation of earnings. Prior studies 
have relied upon either time-series models35 or upon published financial analysts’ 
forecasts.36 Several studies demonstrate that analysts’ forecasts are more accurate 
than those from univariate models, presumably because of the broader information 
set they can incorporate.37 But only scant evidence bears on the extent to which 
aggregate measures of analysts’ forecasts of earnings can be used as an appropriate 
proxy of the stock market as a whole. Data gathering difficulties are probably the 
33Givoly and Lakonishok [71], Elton, Gruber, and Gultekin [49], and Brown, Griffin, Hagerman, 
and Zmijewski [20] 
34Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and Zmijewski [20] 
35Foster [62] and Brown and RozefF [22] 
36Fried and Givoly [66], Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and Zmijewski [20,21] 
37Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and Zmijewski [20,21] conducted a comprehensive comparison of 
quarterly unexpected earnings measures based upon analysts’ forecasts and three univariate time- 
series models. They report that analysts’ forecasts are a superior single proxy for market earnings 
expectations. They further suggest that researchers use financial analysts’ forecasts rather than 
time-series models as a proxy for market earnings expectations. 
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most serious obstacle to use financial analysts’ forecasts.38 We use a Box-Jenkins 
model to forecast earnings. 
3.2.4 Determinants of T-bill Return 
Following Fisher [60], the one-month interest rate, TBt-\, observed at the end 
of month t-1 can be broken into an expected real return for month t, ERt_u and 
expected inflation rate, EIt~1? 
TBt-1 = ERt_i 4- EIt~\. (3-17) 
From equation (3.18), 
TBt = TBt_i -f AEIt-i.39 (3.19) 
These considerations suggests the T-bill rate model (TB) shown at equation (3.21). 
TBt = f[TBt-i(orATBt-i), AEl(orUI)] (3.20) 
where: 
ATBt-\. the changes in the T-bill rate, 
AEI(orUI): the expected inflation (or the unexpected inflation rate). 
i%Indeed. several financial services are being engaged in the collection and publication of forecasts 
for a multiple of companies. Institutional Brokers Estimates System (IBES), Standard and Poor’s 
Earnings Forecaster lists and Icarus Services by Zacks Investment Research, Inc. The IBES data 
are available to us only in the years 1976-1987. 
3&From equation (3.18), 
TBt - TBt~i = AERt-i ■+ AEIt-i. (3.19) 
The evidence of Hess and Bicksler [84], Garbade and Wachtel [68] and Fama and Gibbons [66] 
suggests a model in which the expected real return is a random walk. I=Af the expected real return 
is a random walk, we can use equation (3.20) instead of (3.18) 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A two step procedure is used to integrate appropriate variables into the asset 
allocation process. The first step involves the generation of state probabilities from 
a logit analysis of the sample data.1 Each month within the time periods included 
in the study is categorized as either a “bullish” market months (total return on 
stocks, including dividends, exceeds the return on cash equivalent) or as a “bearish” 
market month (the reverse of a “bullish” market). The goal is to use the data to 
provide the investor with an estimate of the probabilities associated with the broad 
measure of either a “bullish” or “bearish” market period. Logit analysis is used to 
determine which of the various data significantly affect the probabilities of “bullish” 
and “bearish” market months. Determination of how well the model performs in 
predicting “bullish” (“bearish”) market months is based on; 
• the sample used to estimate the logit coefficients; and 
• extra sample data. 
The extra sample data is used in the model verification process. 
1 We believe that investment timing depends more on a proper forecast of the direction than of the 
magnitude of risk environment. Furthermore, logit analysis is superior in generating probabilities 
of risk environment as compared to OLS. Since the forecast of the risk environment of the coming 
month is the main emphasis of this study, we compare the model using logit analysis with the model 
using OLS in terms of rate of return in Chapter 6. 
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The second step of the procedure is to use the estimated probabilities generated 
by the logit analysis to suggest the optimal allocation of funds between the risk-free 
asset and the market portfolio. An asset allocation strategy is developed for the 
purpose of evaluating the feasibility of the procedure. 
4.1 Data 
The asset allocation procedure requires a comparison of the relative performance 
of the market portfolio and the risk-free asset. The market portfolio is represented 
by the total return on the S&P 500 Composite Index. The S&P 500 is selected 
as the market series because “it is readily available, carefully constructed, market 
value-weighted benchmark of common stock performance”.2 The risk-free asset is 
represented by the total return on 1-month U.S. Treasury bills. We use U.S. Treasury 
index which Ibbotson and Sinquerfield [87] has constructed. They use the data in 
the CRSP U.S. Government Bond file through 1976, and The Wall Street Journal 
thereafter. They construct each month a one-bill portfolio containing the short-term 
bill having not less than one month to maturity. To measure holding period returns 
for the one-bill portfolio, they price the bill as of the last trading day of the previous 
month-end and as of the last trading day of the current month. The price of the bill 
at each time is given as (1 - rt/360), where r is the yield on the bill at that time (the 
average of bid and ask quotes in The Wall Street Journal, converted to decimal form) 
and t is the number of days to maturity. The month-end price divided by the previous 
month-end price, minus one, is the return on the bill over the month in question. A 1- 
month excess return is the difference between the continuously compounded 1-month 
2By market value weighted, we mean that the weight of each stock in the index is proportionate 
to its price times the number of shares outstanding. [Ibbotson and Sinquerfield [87]] W*SJ reports 
that The S &P 500’s performance in 1988 differed by as much as half a percentage point, depending 
on which of investment firms did the computing. The tabulation and factors such as when the 
dividends are considered to be received may be handled in a variety of legitimate ways. [US'./, 
Jan.26, 1989] 
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on stock portfolio and the continuously compounded 1-month Treasury bill return 
from Ibbotson associates [87]. 
Monthly data on all of these variables is gathered for the time period from January 
1962 to December 1988. Twenty-seven years is long enough to contain several major 
market cycles and therefore sufficiently long to justify the use of asymptotic statistical 
theory. Each month, beginning with the first month of 1962 and continuing through 
the last month of 1976, is evaluated by comparing the monthly return on the market 
portfolio represented by the S&P 500 Index to the monthly return on the risk-free asset 
(U.S. Treasury bills) to determine whether the month was a “bullish” or “bearish” 
month as previously defined. The classification of the state of each month becomes 
the dichotomous dependent variable for the logit model (“bullish” = 1 and “bearish” 
= 0). A holdout sample, comprised of all months beginning in 1977 and continuing 
through the last month of 1987, is evaluated for the purpose of model verification. 
The sources of data include various issues of the Business Conditions Digest, 
Survey of Current Business, The Wall Street Journal, The SEC Statistical Bulletin 
and Ibbotson and Sinquerfield [87]. 
To be useful, the data must be available to the investor at the time the asset 
allocation decision is made. Therefore, the publication lags of all variables used in 
this study are taken into consideration.3 
Table 4.1 reports the variables, definitions and data sources. 
3Figure 4.1 illustrates the typical sequence of events which result in the publication of the CPI. 
First, the price data are sampled in the middle of the month, so that the January inflation rate 
measures price changes which occur between December 15 and January 15. This is referred to as 
the measurement month. Second, previous researchers have used stock returns from the end of 
one month to the end of the next month, thus measuring the stock market reaction to January s 
inflation over the calendar month from January 1 to January 31. Third, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics doesn’t announce the CPI until approximately three weeks after the end of the calendar 
month. Thus, the January inflation rate is announced on about February 21 [See Schwert [138]]. 
Umstead [157] suggests a one-month publication lag for the leading composite index published by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
50 
1 
nj 
N 
(VI 
■^r 
\ 
OJ 
r- 
s 
OJ 
n 
OJ 
OJ 
\ 
in 
\ 
CD 
\ 
OJ 
OJ 
s 
OJ 
in 
\ 
OJ 
51 
F
ig
u
re
 4
.1
 
T
y
p
ic
a
l 
C
h
ro
n
o
lo
g
y
 o
f 
th
e
 C
o
n
su
m
e
r 
P
ri
c
e
 
In
d
e
x
 
Table 4.1 Variables, Definitions and Data sources 
Variable Definition or Source 
Stock return Return on S&P 500 
from Ibbotson and Sinquerfield [87], 
updated for 1987-1988 (CRSP) 
Treasury bill return Return on 1-month T-bill 
from Ibbotson and Sinquerfield [87], 
updated for 1987-1988 (CRSP) 
Yield on below 
Baa-rated long-term bonds 
Yields from Business Statistics 
and Survey of Current Business 
Yield on Aaa-rated bonds Yields from Business Statistics 
and Survey of Current business 
Monthly growth, 
industrial production 
log IPt - log IPt-1 
from Business Statistics 
and Survey of Current Business 
The dividend-price ratio Yields based on annual dividends 
from Business Statistics 
and Survey of Current Business 
The Composite Index published by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
in the Business Conditions Digest 
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4.2 Logit Analysis 
The problem to be addressed herein is the prediction of “bullish” and “bearish” 
market months from appropriate data. The questions to be answered are 
• W hat are the appropriate variables that significantly affect the probability of 
the market’s excess return; and 
• How accurately does the model predict a given state of the market0 
Superficially, the problem appears appropriate for the use of ordinary least squares 
regression analysis (OLS). However, several problems are encountered with that tech 
nique due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable. Regression analysis 
assumes that the data satisfies the following assumptions: 
Y = Bo BiXn -f ... -f Bp-i AliP_i + ei (4.1) 
where 
Bq, Bi,..., Bp-i are unknown parameters 
A^i,..., Arl(P_i are known, non-stochastic variables 
e{ are error terms that are independent, and N(0,<r2) 
i = 1,..., n 
The purpose of the regression model is to specify the relationship between X and 
Y by estimating the actual parameters, J9p_i, which generated by sample data. OLS 
passes a line through the data which minimizes the sum of the squared deviations 
of the observed points from corresponding points on the fitted line with the same X 
coordinates. Under classical regression assumptions, the estimates generated by the 
OLS procedure are the Best Linear Unbiased Estimates (BLUE) of the popuiatioi 
parameters. If the error term “e” is normally distributed, then the least squares 
estimates are identical with the maximum likelihood estimates. 
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However, due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable used in this 
study, the assumptions of the regression model are not met. The difficulties of the 
standard regression model when the dependent variable is dichotomous are adequately 
explained by Judge, Griffiths, Hill, and Lee [94]. The regression model implicitly 
assumes a cardinal dependent variable. Therefore, regression is an inappropriate tool 
for the analysis of “bullish” and “bearish” stock market periods as defined in this 
study. The logit model is developed specifically to overcome the problems encountered 
with OLS when the dependent variable is categorical.4 Multicollinearity can affect 
the signs of logit coefficients; however, unlike regression analysis, multicollinearity 
is expected to have no effect on testing the significance of individual variables in 
a logit equation. In regression analysis, multicollinearity biases the standard errors 
of the regression coefficients which in turn are used in individual t tests. Since such 
standard errors are not considered in maximum likelihood ratio tests, multicollinearity 
is expected to have no effect on these tests. The computation cost of logit analysis 
is likely to be greater than that of discriminant analysis. Discriminant analysis, 
however, requires very restrictive assumptions, including multivariate normality of the 
independent variables and equal covariances across all groups. Further, discriminant 
analysis does not generate accurate probabilities and unique discriminant coefficients. 
In view of these problems and limitations, discriminant analysis is not an appropriate 
statistical technique for constructing market timing models. 
4Probit and logit deal with the identical problem of predicting the level of a dependent variable 
that is measured on a nominal or ordinal scale. The difference lies solely in the assumption made 
about the frequency distribution of this response. In probit it is taken to be normally distributed; in 
logit, a logistic distribution is assumed. The choice of model is largely a matter of personal preference 
rather than practical significanc.e. Empirically it makes little difference, first because all the formulas 
and results central to probit can be simply rewritten in terms of the logistic transformation. Second, 
the results of both transformations are very similar. Very large data sets would be needed to show 
that one gives a better fit than the other for any particular study. Most economists have favored 
logit because of the direct interpretability of the logistic function. 
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Logit analysis will generate the Y(A";) from the linear combination of the explana¬ 
tory variables as shown by the equation: 
Y = X£ + e (4.2) 
where; Y is (Nxl) vector of response variable, X is an (NxP) matrix of n observations 
of k explanatory variables, is a (Pxl) vector of unknown coefficients and e is an 
(Nxl) vector of error terms. 
For the ith observation, the first category (Rx) will be observed if: Y[X{) < Uu 
the second category (R2) will be observed if U\ < Y(X.) < U2. 
Thus the probability of observing a particular response Rj is: 
P(Rj) = P{Uj-1 < Y(Xi)) (4.3) 
P(Rj) = F(Y(Xt) - —i—•) - F(Y(Xi) -&) (4.4) 
<J <J 
where: F(.) is the cumulative logistic probability distribution function and Y(X{) is 
the mean of Y(X{) for the ith observation (E(Yi) = £m=i BmX.m^). 
As can be observed from equation (4.3) and (4.4), the problem of estimating the 
P(Rj) is the same as estimating the Y and the Uj s. The estimation of Y only requires 
the joint estimation of B and U in order to determine the probability of observing 
particular responses for the dependent variable given the values of the independent 
variable. 
Maximum likelihood estimation is an appropriate procedure for the joint esti¬ 
mation of B and U. One of the principal advantages of using maximum likelihood 
estimation rather than discriminant analysis is that the statistical properties of the 
maximum likelihood estimators are both known and desirable. The general expression 
for the jth response for the ith observation is determined following: 
P(Rj,i) = F(E BmXm.i - Uj.0 - F(£ 1 - Uj) (4.5) 
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The corresponding log likelihood function is 
L-(B, U) = £ £) l„[F( £ - rr,_x) - B( £ - IT,)] (4.6) 
t=l j=l m=l m=l 
The first order condition for maximum likelihood estimates is given by partially dif¬ 
ferentiating (4.6) with respect to i?m and Uj and setting each partial derivative to 
zero as follows: 
= 0, m = 1,... ,p (4.7) 
II o
 
W
o. II to
 
(4.8) 
dLm(B,U) 
dBm 
dL~(B,U) 
dUj 
Simultaneously solving the resulting system of P+N-2 non-linear (in the B’s and 
U’s) equations can be accomplished through the use of gradient methods, e.g. the 
Gauss-Newton optimization technique. The estimates of B and U are then used to 
find the probability of a particular response (j) for a given observation (i) P{Rj,i) by 
substituting the estimated values into (4.4). 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONSTRUCTION AND 
VALIDATION OF THE MODEL 
5.1 Explanatory Variable Structure 
This section describes the basic characteristics for all the sample months, bullish 
market months only, and bearish market months.1 
Table 5.1 reviews the explanatory variables used in the analysis and represents the 
abbreviations used in subsequent statistical tables. Table 5.2 presents the descriptive 
statistics of explanatory variables and reveals some interesting characteristics about 
the sample data. 
The eight proxies selected as independent variables are not normally distributed. 
In particular, since normal distributions are symmetrical and unimodal, they have 
skewness indices of zero and kurtosis indices of three. As can be seen from Table 5.2, 
however, the descriptive statistics associated with the eight independent variables 
selected show that these variables have non-zero skewness indices. Therefore, the 
selected variables are not univariate normal and hence, not multivariate normal.2 
1 While we consider all the variables we have discussed in Chapter 3, we have listed only the 
variables with a significant relation to the dependent variable. 
2Univariate normality is a necessary but not sufficient condition of multivariate normality. Thus, 
these variables that are not univariate normal cannot be multivariate normal. 
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Table 5.1 Explanatory Abbreviations 
Variable Abbreviation Variable Definition 
DS Default Spread 
DP Dividend-Price Ratio 
EP Earnings-Price Ratio 
G Growth Rate from DDM 
ERNG Average Earinings Growth Rate 
for one-year on a Moving Basis 
Cl Cycle Indicators 
DTB The Change in 1-month T-bill Rate 
PTB T-bill Rate in Previous Month 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Sample Statistics 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
All Bullish Bearish 
DS Mean 0.008573 0.008691 0.008485 
Standard Deviation 0.003867 0.004160 0.003523 
Skewness 1.111 1.048 1.188 
Kurtosis 0.789 0.454 1.319 
DP Mean 3.3897 3.4065 3.3698 
Standard Deviation 0.5363 0.554 0.518 
Skewness 1.659 1.678 1.648 
Kurtosis 3.091 2.972 3.469 
EP Mean 0.0597 0.05955 0.06024 
Standard Deviation 0.0145 0.015 0.014 
Skewness 1.357 1.463 1.219 
Kurtosis 1.109 1.425 1.109 
G Mean 0.00018 -0.00103 0.00161 
Standard Deviation 0.00783 0.00790 0.00755 
Skewness -0.270 -0.206 -0.335 
Kurtosis -1.076 -1.067 -1.171 
ERNG Mean 0.00590 0.00505 0.00709 
Standard Deviation 0.00765 0.00738 0.00799 
Skewness -0.523 -0.720 -0.412 
Kurtosis -0.327 0.367 -0.493 
Cl Mean 103.723 102.344 105.354 
Standard Deviation 7.5607 7.053 7.855 
Skewness 0.904 1.132 0.696 
Kurtosis -0.334 0.367 -0.836 
DTB Mean 0.000011 -0.000845 0.000112 
Standard Deviation 0.000596 0.005621 0.000619 
Skewness -0.427 -1.726 0.609 
Kurtosis 4.412 7.332 1.229 
PTB Mean 0.004030 0.003833 0.004260 
Standard Deviation 0.001300 0.001192 0.001377 
Skewness 0.674 0.750 0.536 
Kurtosis 0.022 0.295 -0.248 
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Thus, the multivariate normality assumption required by discriminant analysis is 
violated. 
Table 5.3 were developed for each group of months to explore whether differences 
between months could be used to categorize a period as either bullish or as bearish. 
As indicated above, the proposed theory predicts that as compared to bullish 
market months, bearish market months have higher levels of G, ERNG, Cl, DTB, 
PTB and lower levels of DS, and DP. The rest of the variables are insignificant. As 
shown in Table 5.3. the means of eight independent variables generally exhibit such 
relationships. As can be seen from Table 5.3, the univariate tests provide evidence 
that the expected relationships do exist. For example, bullish market periods have 
mean DTB of -.0010, which is lower than that of bearish market periods (.0010), and 
mean DP of 3.4065, which is higher than that of bearish market periods (3.3698). 
To examine the characteristics of the sample data further, the variance-covariance 
matrices for both bullish periods and bearish periods are computed. These matrices 
are presented in Table 5.4. 
Tables 5.4, clearly shows that bullish and bearish market periods did not have 
equal covariances during the test period. Thus, both the multivariate normality 
and equal covariances assumptions are violated by the sample data. Consequently, 
discriminant analysis is not an appropriate statistical technical technique to use in 
the construction of our timing model. It would be appropriate if its less restrictive 
assumptions are met. However, logit analysis is still appropriate because it requires 
less restrictive assumptions. 
5.2 Construction of the Model 
The initial base model is constructed on the basis of the 179 months from 2/62 to 
12/76. This data base’s summary characteristics are described in the section above. 
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Table 5.3 Univariate Statistics Showing the Relationship 
Variables Expected Sign Bullish 
Mean 
Bearish t-test 
Mean p-valuea 
DS | + 0.0087 | 0.0084 0.660 
DP + 3.4065 3.3698 0.649 
EP | + .0599 : 0.0595 0.853 
G - | -0.0010 0.0016 0.024 
ERNG ' 0.0050 0.0069 0.105 
ll CI - 102.3443 | 105.3537 0.008 
DTB -0.0001 0.0001 0.022 
PTB - 0.0038 0.0043 0.024 
“two-sided tests 
Table 5.4 Variance-Covariance Matrix for All Periods 
DS 
DS 1.000 
DP All 
Bullish 
Bearish 
0.667 
0.475 
0.590 
EP All 
Bullish 
Bearish 
0.811 
0.698 
0.765 
G All 
Bullish 
Bearish 
0.508 
0.492 
0.488 
ERNG All 
Bullish 
Bearish 
-0.536 
-0.450 
-0.496 
Cl All 
Bullish 
Bearish 
0.272 
0.417 
0.319 
DTB All 
Bullish 
Bearish 
-0.155 
-0.023 
-0.100 
PTB All 
Bullish 
Bearish 
0.498 
0.240 
0.365 
DP EP G 
1.000 
0.927 
0.909 
0.918 
1.000 
—0.044 
-0.012 
-0.356 
0.266 
0.284 
0.272 
1.000 
-0.222 
0.064 
-0.094 
-0.333 
-0.019 
-0.188 
-0.455 
-0.130 
-0.277 
-0.026 
0.103 
0.268 
0.273 
0.407 
0.063 
0.610 
0.662 
0.645 
-0.413 
0.140 
-0.159 
-0.338 
0.128 
-0.120 
0.181 
-0.074 
0.088 
0.562 
0.568 
0.547 
0.649 
0.551 
0.592 
0.456 
0.466 
0.474 
ERNG Cl DT8 
1.000 
0.082 
0.342 
0.230 
1.000 
0.033 0.113 1.000 
0.071 -0.007 
0.027 0.084 
-0.220 0.284 -0.271 
0.224 0.312 0.042 
0.027 0.322 -0.077 
PTB 
1.000 
62 
Based on these sample data, logit analysis results are contained in Table 5.5 and 
Table 5.6. 
Because model 2 was best in predicting the direction of the markets, this is the 
model that is used in the subsequent simulation of actual investment policy. 
Model 2 yields the following market timing prediction model: 
Yi = F(Zi) (5.1) 
Zi=0.11 - 646.32 x DTB - 433.83 x PTB + 0.58 x DP - 25.74 x ERNG 
where: Y{ = conditional probability of bullish market periods 
F(.) = the cumulative logistic probability distribution function 
Z{ — theoretical index 
The overall significance level of the model 2 is 0.0026 indicating a good fit. Two 
variables, changes in T-bill (DTB) and T-bill in previous month (PTB), are significant 
at 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Two variables, dividend-price ratio (DP) and 
growth rate in earnings (ERNG), are not significant at 10% level. However, the overall 
accuracy rate drops from 64 % to approximately 62 % when these two variables are 
not included in the model. Apparently these variables are contributing information 
to the overall model even though these variables are found to be insignificant at the 
.10 level. 
The signs of the coefficients are consistent with the proposed theory. As suggested 
by the proposed theory, DP has positive coefficient, DTB, PTB, and ERNG have neg¬ 
ative coefficients. Thus, our model and the proposed theory are mutually supportive. 
The positive coefficient for the DP variable reveal that high dividend-price ratios sig¬ 
nal that future returns will be high because stocks are temporarily low. The negative 
coefficient for the ERNG variable indicates that if earnings growth rate is too high, 
the price may not be reflecting fundamental growth prospects and should be expected 
63 
Table 5.5. Results from Logit Analysis 
Model 1 
Coefficient 
2 
Coefficient 
3 
Coefficient 
4 
Coefficient 
5 
Coefficient 
Constant 
(T-ratio) 
-.1914 
(-.181) 
.1087 
(.099) 
4.1551 
(1.383) 
.0182 
(.016) 
3.0242 
(1.194) 
DTB 
(T-ratio) 
-650.134 
(-2.193)**° 
-646.324 
(-2.155)** 
-620.420 
(-2.101)** 
-643.114 
(-2.146)** 
-610.619 
(-2.048)** 
PTB 
(T-ratio) 
-401.073 
(-2.189) 
-433.828 
(-2.828)***b 
-417.478 
(-2.230) 
-427.871 
(-2.767)*** 
-366.243 
(-2.252)** 
BMA 
(T-ratio) 
-21.588 
(-.355) 
DP 
(T-ratio) 
.5886 
(1.497) 
.5808 
(1.546) 
.6288 
(1.574) 
.6634 
(1.498) 
.5184 
(1.365) 
G 
(T-ratio) 
-11.029 
(-.443) 
17.5226 
(.561) 
ERNG 
(T-ratio) 
-25.744 
(-1.210) 
-30.515 
(-1.211) 
-19.752 
(-.910) 
Cl 
(T-ratio) 
-.0290 
(-1.275) 
Chi-square 
(Significance) 
15.018 
(.0047) 
16.311 
(.0026) 
17.424 
(.0038) 
16.437 
(.0057) 
17.944 
(.0030) 
“** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
6***Significant at the 1 percent level 
64 
Table 5.6 In-Sample Classification Results 
1 Model Actual Status No. of Cases Predicted Status 
Bullish Bearish 
Accuracy Rate 
1 1 Bullish 97 72 25 74.2 % 
Bearish 
Overall 
82 41 41 50.0 % 
63.1 % 
2 Bullish 97 85 12 87.6 % 
Bearish 
Overall 
82 51 31 37.8 % 
64.8 % 
3 Bullish 97 76 21 78.4 % 
Bearish 
Overall 
82 43 39 47.6 % 
64.2 % 
4 Bullish 97 77 20 79.4 % 
Bearish 
Overall 
82 48 34 41.5 % 
62.0 % 
5 Bullish 97 75 22 77.3 % 
Bearish 
Overall 
82 41 41 50.0 % 
64.7 % 
6 Bullish 97 76 21 78.4 % 
Bearish 
Overall 
82 44 38 46.3 % 
63.6 % 
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to decline. The negative coefficients for the PTB (proxy for expected inflation) and 
DTB (proxy for the changes in expected inflation) confirm that since the empirical 
proxy for expected inflation is the Treasury-bill rate at the beginning of the period, 
changes in stock prices could be associated with opposite changes in the proxy if real 
interest rate changes are negatively correlated with stock returns. 
The in-sample accuracy rates of the model 2 are 87.6% for bullish periods, 37.8% 
for bearish periods. This corresponds to the misclassification of 12 bullish periods, 
51 bearish periods, respectively.3 Table 5.6 presents the details. 
The overall accuracy rate of our model is computed as a weighted average of the 
individual accuracy rates for bullish and bearish market periods. The weights used 
are derived from the relative occurrence of bullish and bearish market periods, which 
is 0.542 to 0.458.4 With this computation procedure, a classification that predicts 
all periods as bullish has an overall accuracy rate of 54.2%. Given that 54.2% of 
all periods are bullish, our model’s 87.6% accuracy rate for predicting bullish is not 
surprising. Predicting a relatively common occurrence (i.e. bullish periods) correctly 
is more important than predicting a relatively rare occurrence (i.e. bearish periods) 
correctly. Thus, this model of only four variables can be used to predict objectively 
3Chua and Woodward [33] defined accuracy in a ex ante or ex post sense. In the ex ante sense, ac¬ 
curacy would be the probability of forecasting a bull/bear market with the market in the subsequent 
period turning out to be bull/bear market. In the ex post sense, accuracy is the probability that the 
market in a period has been observed to be bullish/bearish when the forecast for the period, made 
at the beginning of the time interval, was bullish/bearish. In an ex post performance evaluation 
study, the question to be answered is how well a market-timing strategy would have done. We first 
consider whether the market was bullish or bearish in a given period, then we check whether we had 
forecast a bull or bear market for that period to determine what return would have earned. Chua 
and Woodward [33], as well as Sharpe [141] and Jeffrey [89], analyzed the accuracy of a market 
timer in what Chua and Woodward [33] call the ex post framework. We focus on the accuracy here 
in the ex post sense. Chua and Woodward [33] concluded that a market timer must be correct in at 
least 80 percent of all bull periods and 50 percent of all bear periods for market timing to pay with 
annual timing. Droms [42] showed that a market timer must be correct in at least 60 percent of all 
bull periods and 40 percent of all bear periods for market timing to pay with monthly timing. 
4Sharpe [141] and Clarke et al [34] used .67 to .33 because Sharpe found that returns on stocks 
exceeded returns on cash in 67% of his sample years 1934-1972. 
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the probabilities of either a “bullish” or “bearish” market month. The weighted 
average accuracy rate of 64% also indicates the degree of fit of our model. The higher 
the number of correct classifications the better the fit of our model. A accuracy rate 
of greater than 50% indicates that the model performs better than naive approach 
relying on chance.5 
Note that the predictive accuracy of the models depend on the value of the cutoff 
probability used.6 Presumably investors have attitudes toward risk which lead them 
to to prefer different cutoff points.7 Thus results derived for a given cutoff probability 
do not necessarily help them decide which model fits their needs. Clearly the rewards 
or costs associated with the different types of correct or incorrect classifications de¬ 
termine the investor's optimal cutoff probability. This issue is further explored in the 
next section. 
Table 5.7 explaining the classificatory power of a model is quite different from the 
table regularly used. 
Column (1) lists the cutoff percentages used to classify a period as bullish or 
bearish. The number of misclassified bullish is shown in column (2) (Type II error), 
column (3) contains the number of misclassified bearish periods (Type I error), and 
column (4) shows how many periods had calculated probabilities less than the cutoff 
level. The number of correctly classified periods is given in column (5). The percent¬ 
age of periods correctly classified (column 6) is determined by dividing the number 
in column (5) by the total number of periods in the test. Note that the maximum 
5These results of our model predictions exceeded those achieved by the best naive model at the 
0.01 significance level. 
6 Logit analysis generates conditional probabilities but does not dictate what the cut-off probabil¬ 
ity between the groups(i.e., bullish and bearish market periods) should be. In contrast, discriminant 
analysis computes an optimal Z-score to classify the observations into groups given the prior prob¬ 
abilities and sample data. 
7The cutoff points represent a probability; for example, if the cutoff point was 0.20, a period with 
a probability below that level would be classified as bearish (a 0); a probability above 0.20 would 
be classified as bullish (a 1). 
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Table -5.7 Classification Accuracy 
Proposed 
Cutoff 
Predict-0 
Actual-1 
Predict-1 
Actual-0 
No. Below 
Cutoff 
No. 
Correct 
Percent 
Correct 
.00 0 82 0 97 54.2 
.05 0 82 0 97 54.2 
.10 0 82 0 97 54.2 
.15 •> 79 4 99 55.3 
.20 2 
7 1 100 55.9 
.25 o 75 10 101 56.4 
.30 3 74 11 102 57.0 
.35 0 64 23 110 61.5 
.40 6 59 29 114 63.7 
.45 11 53 40 115 64.2 
.46 12 51 43 116 64.8 Ma Fb 
.50 19 45 56 115 64.2 E= 
-OO 35 OO •JO 84 111 62.0 
.60 49 22 109 108 60.3 
.65 67 15 134 97 54.2 
o
 
r- t 87 6 163 96 53.6 
.75 91 2 171 86 48.0 
.80 94 0 176 85 47.5 
.85 96 0 178 83 46.4 
.90 96 0 178 83 46.4 
.95 97 0 179 82 45.8 
1.00 97 0 179 82 45.8 
*M - Maximum Accuracy level 
'P - Proportions* probability cutoff 
CE - Equal probability cutoff 
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accuracy level is a "data driven"7 cutoff point and it can vary based on changes in 
the database. The 50 % cutoff assumed equal probabilities of groups; proportional 
probabilities should also be considered. 
Figure 5.1 depicts the frontier trading of one error against another, when the 
errors are expressed as percentages. Figure 5.2 shows the mapping from cutoff points 
to the two different types of errors. The cutoff point which minimizes the sum of 
errors is .46. At that point, 12.4% of the bullish periods and 62.2% bearish periods 
axe misclassified. Note also that if we select a cutoff point equal to .10, then no Type 
II error occurs and if we select a cutoff point equal to .80, then no Type I error occurs. 
As discussed above, our model is very conservative in the sense that it attempts 
to predict bullish periods correctly at the expense of bearish periods. Recall that 
their relative occurrence is 54.2 to 45.8. However, this conservative model may not 
be optimal when the misclassification cost of predicting a bearish periods incorrectly 
as a bullish periods (i.e., Type I error) is very much higher than the misclassification 
cost of predicting bullish periods incorrectly els bearish periods (i.e., Type II error). 
Under such circumstances, predicting a rare occurrence incorrectly is very costly and 
thus, attempting to predict bullish periods correctly at the expense of bearish periods 
may not be appropriate. 
All the accuracy rates presented above are in-sample accuracy rates. In other 
words, the accuracy rates are computed on the basis of the estimation sample. Since 
the same 179 periods are also used to construct our model, the in-sample accuracy 
rates are upward biased. Thus, the in-sample accuracy rates provide only a biased 
indication of the predictive ability of our model. Consequently, hold-out accuracy 
rates need to be computed before the predictive ability of our model can be assessed. 
The hold-out accuracy rates for our model, as computed using subsequent periods 
and the Lachenbruch jackknife method, are presented in the next section. 
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5.3 Lachenbruch Jackknife Method 
To test the predictive power of our model in discriminating between bullish and 
bearish market periods, the Lachenbruch jackknife method is used.8 The jackknife 
technique avoids the problem of testing the model on the same data used to fit the 
model. It is also distribution-free and does not require multivariate normality, equal 
dispersion matrices. 
The Lachenbruch method consists of the following steps. First, one sample period 
among the 179 sample periods is held out and a logit model is constructed on the 
remaining 178 sample periods. Second, the resulting logit model is used to compute 
the conditional probability of bullish and bearish market periods for the held-out pe¬ 
riod. Third, the above procedure is repeated for every sample periods. For our model, 
the Lachenbruch method generates 179 logit models and 179 conditional probabilities 
since there are 179 sample observations. The means and standard deviation of the 
179 sets of coefficients resulting from the Lachenbruch method are given in Table 5.8. 
As expected, the means of the 179 sets of coefficient are close to the coefficients 
in our model. Further, Table 5.8 shows that the logit coefficient resulting from the 
Lachenbruch method are rather stable. This implies that our model is also a stable 
timing prediction model. In particular, the coefficients of our model are not influenced 
by any specific sample period. Instead, they reflect the general characteristics of 
bullish and bearish market periods. 
5.4 Predictive Ability of Our Model 
As discussed in the previous section, the in-sample accuracy rates of our model are 
upward biased because the validation sample that is used to compute the in-sample 
accuracy rates is also the estimation sample that is used to construct our model. Thus, 
8P.A. Lachenbruch [105] 
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Table 5.8 Means and Standard Deviation of our Model 
Coefficients Mean Standard Deviation 
Constant 0.10862 0.08384 
DTB -647.962 23.0025 
PTB -434.195 13.2027 
DP 0.58169 0.03139 
ERNG -25.690 1.6120 
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to assess the predictive ability of our model in a more appropriate manner, an eleven- 
year (132-month) hold-out sample is evaluated. Observations of each of the four 
independent variables are taken from readily available published sources as previously 
described and evaluated with prediction using logit equation. The predictions are 
generated as follows. We begin by building an initial base model using data from the 
180 months from 1/62 to 12/76. Given these base model coefficients, we input actual 
lagged data for 12/76 and generate probabilities of market risk environment for 1/77. 
Subsequently, we input actual values for 1/77 and derive an probability of market 
risk environment for 2/77. We do this for all twelve months in 1977. Then the base 
model is updated twelve months (we drop the twelve months in 1962 and add the 
1977 data). We then use this new base model to predict probabilities of market risk 
environment for 1978. 
Table 5.9 shows the results of our model during the hold-out sample period (1977- 
1987). These results indicate that our model is still statistically significant and main¬ 
tains a significance level of 1%. The coefficients remain reasonably stable, particularly 
DTB and ERNG variable. The DTB and the PTB variable continue to be significant 
at the 5% level or less during almost all periods. Interestingly, the DP variable and 
the ERNG variable appears stronger and are now significant at the 5% level. 
The resulting probabilities of each month are compared to the actual state of the 
month to determine our model’s overall accuracy rate. The hold-out sample accuracy 
rates of our model are 73.8% for bullish periods, 43.3% for bearish periods corre¬ 
sponding to the overall accuracy rate of 60.1%. Our model performed better than a 
naive approach relying on chance. These results are similar to the in-sample results. 
However, as expected, the hold-out accuracy rates are lower than the in-sample accu¬ 
racy rates since the latter are upward biased because the estimation sample is used to 
validate the model. The relatively high number of correct classification in the holdout 
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Table 5.5 Results from Logit Analysis during Hold-out Sample Period 
Period 
Constant 
(T-ratio) 
DTB 
(T-ratio' 
PTB 
(T-ratio) 
DP 
(T-ratio) 
ERXG 
(T-ratio) 
Chi-square 
(Significance) 
'53-77 1-8349 
(1.870)*° 
-758.301 
(-2.465)* “ 
-327.405 
(-2.042)** 
-.0377 
(-.123) 
-47.7622 
(-2.256)** 
17.368 
(.0016) 
*54-'78 1.0592 
(1.295) 
-667.489 
(-2.270)** 
-331.454 
(-1.981)** 
.2013 
(.814) 
-46.3444 
(-2.187) 
15.580 
(.0036) 
’55-79 -.3902 
(-.556) 
-569.843 
(-2.034)** 
-91.1316 
--597' 
.2987 
(1.243) 
-46.0593 
(-2.229)** 
12.167 
(.0162) 
:56-:80 -1.2499 
(-1.782)* 
-545.418 
(-2.388)’* 
14.2720 
(.105) 
.413664 
(1.733)* 
-61.8932 
(-2.913)*** 
19.282 
(.0007) 
’67-’81 
! 
-.8288 
(-1.212) 
-363.624 
(-1.924)* 
-150.556 
(-1.689)* 
.4766 
(2.109)** 
-41.4571 
(-2.136)** 
12.200 
(.0159) 
'56-’82 -.6797 
(-1.024) 
-313.774 
(-1.801)* 
-176.958 
(-1.994)** 
.4570 
(2.149)** 
-40.9971 
(-2.200)** 
12.904 
(.0118) 
:6$-:83 -1.0736 
(-1.498) 
-306.543 
(-1.751)* 
-185.897 
(-2.094)** 
.5532 
(2.504)** 
-43.9431 
(-2.592)*** 
16.150 
(.0028) 
570-'84 -.9879 
(-1.290) 
-308.905 
(-1.800)* 
-171.742 
(-1.966)** 
.5180 
(2.254)** 
-44.4255 
(-2.765)*** 
16.480 
(.0024) 
’71-'85 -.9973 
(-1.267) 
-363.925 
(-2.091)** 
-167.415 
(-1.905)* 
.5143 
(2.208)** 
-41.482 
(-2.556)** 
16.330 
(.0026) | 
572-:86 -.3330 
(-1.032) 
-340.902 
(-1.984)** 
-167.844 
(-1.912)* 
.4848 
(2.095)** 
-43.716 
(-2.752)*** 
16.287 
(.0027) 
’73-587 -1.4462 
(-1.728)* 
-273.298 
(-1.664)* 
-134.430 
(-1.544) 
.5733 
(2.465)** 
-53.047 
(-3.259)*** 
19.065 
(.0008) 
a*SIgnificant at the 10 percent level 
% "Significant at the 5 percent level 
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sample period indicates that the probabilities generated by the logit model during 
the within sample period could be considered as accurate probabilities for that time 
period. 
5.5 Consideration of Misclassification Costs 
Logit analysis generates conditional probabilities but does not dictate what the 
cut-off probability between the groups (i.e., bullish and bearish) should be. Therefore, 
to use our model to predict the status of a period, a cut-off probability between 
bullish and bearish must be determined. Bullish periods occur more frequently than 
bearish periods. Therefore, Predicting the status of bullish periods correctly may be 
more important than to predict the status of bearish periods correctly if we ignore 
misclassification costs.9 Another justification for recommending a conservative timing 
model is derived from previous research.10 
Although our model is appropriate in general, less conservative prediction models 
might also be used. In fact, less conservative models may be more appropriate when 
the costs of mis classifying bearish periods as bullish periods (i.e., Type I errors) are 
very much higher than the costs of misclassifying bullish periods as bearish periods 
(i.e., Type II errors). Under such circumstances, while bearish periods occur more 
rarely, the misclassifications of these relatively rare occurrences are very costly. 
Up to this point, misclassification costs have been ignored. When they are consid¬ 
ered explicitly, the procedure to be used to determine the optimal cut-off probability 
differs significantly from that used so far. Specifically, when misclassification costs 
9To predict bearish periods correctly may be more important than to predict bullish periods if 
the amount lost in the bearish periods is far greater than that made in a typical bullish period. 
10Chua and Woodward [33], and Clarke et al [34] showed that accuracy in forecasting bull markets 
is more important than accuracy in forecasting bear markets. For example, eighty percent bull 
market forecasting accuracy outperforms buying and holding regardless of bear market forecasting 
ability without transaction costs. By comparison, seventy percent bear market forecasting accuracy 
outperforms buying and holding only if bull market forecasting exceeds fifty percent. 
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ire considered explicitly, the optimal cut-off probability for our model is no longer 
:ha: probability that minimizes the misclassifications of bearish periods, given that 
- - Denods are classified correctly. Instead, the optimal cut-off probability is that 
rrchahiliTy that minimizes the expected misclassification costs of using our model. 
The expected misclassification costs of using our model can be expressed as follows: 
EC = [Pbr){Pi)(Ci) + (Pbl)(Eii)(Ch) (5.2) 
where EC = expected misclassification costs of using our model 
Pbr — prior probability of bearish periods (0.458) 
Pbl = prior probability of bullish periods (0.542) 
Pj = conditional probability of Type I errors (no. of Type I errors 179) 
Pil = conditional probability of Type II errors (no. of Type II errors 179) 
Cj = misclassification costs of a Type I error 
Cii = misclassification costs of a Type II error 
In the above formula, Cj and C/j are unknown parameters. Therefore, Cj and Cn 
can only be speculated to determine the optimal cut-off probability for our model. 
Instead, the expected misclassification costs of using our model are computed under 
alternative assumptions about the relative misclassification costs of Type I and Type 
II errors (i.e., Ci : Cn). This procedure is illustrated below. 
Given the values of Pbr, Pbl> Pi, an<^ Pih EC can be expressed as follows. 
EC = (0.458)(Wj/179)(C/) + (0.542)(Af///179)(C/J) (5.3) 
where N[ = number of Type I errors ; Nu = number of Type II errors 
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That is, 
EC = 0.0025586 x (Nr x CT) + 0.0030279 x (Nn x Cn) 
The above formula shows that because bullish periods occur more frequently than 
bearish periods, misclassifying bullish periods (i.e., Nn) contributes more to EC than 
misclassifying bearish periods (i.e., Ni) when misclassification costs (i.e., Ci and Cn) 
are ignored. The different EC’s for our model under different cut-off probabilities 
and optimal cut-off rate when Cj : Cn is 1:1 are presented in Table 5.10. This table 
illustrates the determination of the optimal cut-off probability when Ci : Cn is 1:1. 
As can be seen from Table 5.10, when the misclassification cost of a Type I error 
is equal to the misclassification cost of a Type II error, the optimal cut-off probability 
and the corresponding optimal cut-off standard deviate are .46 and -.1603, respec¬ 
tively. (These optimal cut-off values are identical to those specified by the model 
in previous section.) With this optimal cut-off probability, the expected misclassi¬ 
fication costs of using our model is .16731.11 All other cut-off probabilities lead to 
higher EC’s when Ci : Cn is 1:1. Thus, when Ci : Cn is 1:1, our model as specified 
in Table 5.10 is appropriate. This specification of our model uses an optimal cut¬ 
off probability of .46 in its prediction rule. However, this specification of our model 
may not be optimal for other values of Cj and Cn. In particular, different relative 
misclassification costs may lead to different optimal cut-off values. Accordingly, the 
optimal cut-off probabilities and expected misclassification costs for using our model 
are computed for Ci : Cn ranging from 1:4 to 4:1. The results are summarized in 
Table 5.10. 
11In this study, the expected misclassification costs of using our model are computed only for 
the purpose of determining the optimal cut-off probability. They do not have units and are not 
interpretable unless actual values of Cj and C/j are used. In other words, only when the actual 
values of Ci and Cn including transaction costs are available, the actual expected misclassification 
costs of using our model can be computed in terms of dollar amounts. 
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Table 5.10' Summary of Optimal Cut-off Probabilities 
Ci : Cu Y Z Nt Nn EC 
1 : 4 .10 -2.1972 82 0 .21074 
1 : 3.5 .10 -2.1972 82 0 .21074 
1 : 3 .40 -.4055 59 6 .20599 
1 : 2.5 .40 -.4055 59 6 .19693 
1 : 2 .40 -.4055 59 6 .18787 
1 : 1.5 .40 -.4055 59 6 .17881 
1 : 1 .46 -.1603 51 12 .16731 
1.5: 1 .50 -.0009 45 19 .23085 
2 : 1 .60 .4055 22 49 .26106 
2.5: 1 .80 1.3863 0 94 .28388 
3 : 1 .80 1.3863 0 94 .28388 
3.5: 1 .80 1.3863 0 94 .28388 
4 : 1 .80 1.3863 0 94 .28388 
As can be seen from Table 5.10, our model is sensitive to varying relative mis- 
classification costs for Ci : Cu ranging from 1:3 to 2:1, which is, optimal cut-off 
probability (Y) for our model vary between .4 and .6. But, for Ci : Cu ranging above 
1:3.5, optimal cut-off probability remains at .1 and for Ci : Cu ranging below 2.5:1, 
optimal probability remains at .8. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CREATING A STRATEGY 
AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The probabilities generated by the logit model are used to construct a portfolio 
at the beginning of each month during the test period. The logit model used in our 
study provides categorical information. The probabilities produced are in relation 
to “bullish” and “bearish” market periods. They are state probabilities and do not 
specifically predict a return on the market or on the risk-free asset. 
6.1 Asset Allocation Strategy 
Five strategies, as presented in Table 6.1, is evaluated on the basis of their end of 
period wealth. 
Strategy 1 buys U.S. Treasury bills and represents the return on the risk-free asset 
during the test period. Strategy 2 buys and hold the S & P 500 Index through the 
entire period. S & P 500 Index is widely used despite its limitations as a proxy for 
“THE” market. Buy-and-hold strategies are “do nothing” strategies: No matter what 
happens to relative values, no rebalancing is required. Buy-and-hold strategies are 
easy to analyze. They also serve as anchor points for more complex approaches. 
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Table 6.1 Strategies 
Strategy 1; Buys U.S. Treasury bills and represents the return on the risk-free asset 
during the test period. 
Strategy 2; Buys and holds the S&P 500 Index through the entire period 
Strategy 3; Switches between one hundred percent U.S. Treasury bills and one hun¬ 
dred percent equities (one hundred percent T-bills if bearish, one hundred per¬ 
cent equities if bullish). 
Strategy 4; Manages portfolio according to the state probabilities generated by the 
logit analysis. Comparison of Strategy 3 and Strategies 4 is to explore whether 
allocating funds on the basis of probabilities is superior or if simple switching 
policy is just as effective. 
Strategy 5; Considers option-like payoff portfolio. For most investors, the achieve¬ 
ment of some guaranteed minimum return is the most important consideration; 
for them, the mean-variance tradeoffs of MPT are insufficient for determin¬ 
ing appropriate asset allocations. To secure a minimum return while retaining 
upside potential, option strategy is considered. 
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Table 6.2 Asset Allocation of Strategy 4 
Probabilities of 
A Bullish Month 
Percentage of Funds 
Allocated to Equity 
.65 - 1.00 
.20 - .65 
.00 - .20 
100 (bullish) 
90 or 10 (neutral) 
0 (bearish) 
Strategy 3 was to switch to one hundred percent equities whenever the logit model 
signaled a “bullish” market month (probabilities greater than .46) and to move to one 
hundred percent U.S. Treasury bills whenever the logit model signaled a “bearish” 
upcoming market month (probabilities less than .46). Transaction costs for the timing 
portfolio were the full two percent when moving into or out of equities. 
Strategy 4 was based on the rationale that we should not attempt to make frequent 
shifts in the portfolio asset mix based on modest change in probabilities. Those shifts 
will add value only when we have a high degree of confidence because of the impact of 
transaction costs. The asset allocation schedule ( Table 6.2 ) is proposed for investors 
based on simulation results during in sample period.1 
As we can see from the Figure 6.1, The probability range of .20 - .65 is termed the 
“neutral market periods.” Probabilities in that range are too close to neutral to make 
any reliable judgements about the outlook for the next month. If we were already 
committed at the 100% level and the probability for the upcoming month was in the 
neutral periods, it is assumed that we would move to 90% level for the upcoming 
month rather than incur a transaction cost to move from the 100% level back to the 
1This strategy is derived after a lot of trial and error. 
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close to 0% level. If we were already committed at the 0% level and the probability 
for the upcoming month was in the problem range, we would move to 10% level for 
the upcoming month. If we were already committed at the 90% or 10% level and the 
probability for the upcoming month was in the problem range, we would stay at the 
present level for the upcoming month.2 During within sample period (1962-76), this 
strategy signalled 61 switches between S Sz P 500 Index and T-bills (Figure 6.2). 
Strategy 5 considers an option-like payoff portfolio. For most investors, the 
achievement of some guaranteed minimum return is also an important considera¬ 
tion. To secure a minimum return while retaining upside potential, we consider a 
stable mix strategy (40% equity and 60% T-bills).3 Strategy 2 does not always depict 
the strategic choice a portfolio manager must make. We employ both buy and hold 
S & P 500 Index and a stable asset mix index for comparison against the record of a 
timing approach. 
6.2 Results of the Allocation Strategies 
Table 6.3 contains a summary of the performance results from investment using 
predictions from our model. Results are reported both with and without adjust¬ 
ments for commissions. Transaction costs are assumed to be two percent when mov¬ 
ing into or out of securities, which is obviously conservative in an era of negotiated 
commissions.4 No commissions are assumed to be incurred on the purchase of T-bills 
(i.e., acquisition at the original auction).5 Transaction costs are calculated on the 
2 Strategy 4-1 is based on the probability range of .15 - .65 instead of .20 - .65 
3Perold [122] has recently offered a portfolio insurance decision rule as Constant Proportion 
Portfolio Insurance (CPPI). This strategy is basically, a special case of a more general set of policies 
that also embrace the constant-mix. As pointed out by Perold and Sharpe [123], many investment 
managers have been using it without knowing it. 
4actual commissions would probably lower 
5Sharpe [141] assumed a transaction cost of two percent. This may have been a realistic level 
for individual investors in 1975, but is not representative of the transaction costs now incurred by 
institutional investors. Wells Fargo’s market timing model charged .25 percent one way for changes 
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percentage of funds allocated to stocks each month. When only a percentage of the 
funds are allocated to stocks, the two percent transaction cost applied only to the 
corresponding percentage of funds that are moved either into or out of stocks. 
Strategy 3 (Switches between one hundred percent T-bills and one hundred percent 
equities) has the highest growth rate during the test period without transaction costs. 
With 2% transaction costs, strategy 4 has the highest growth rate. The terminal 
wealth attained by strategy 4 is 114% greater than that attained by strategy 2 ( Buy 
and Hold S & P Index ) over the test period.6 Thus, we can see some advantages 
to allocating funds in relation to the state probabilities generated by the logit model 
when we assess the transaction costs. During the test period, strategy 3, 4, and 4-1 
provide performance superior to strategy 1, and 2 with and without transaction costs. 
To be valid a test of this (and any other predictive) model needs to evaluate 
the model using data that were not included in the development of the model. In 
other words, the model should be confirmed with a holdout sample. To test the 
consistency, the rules derived from these periods are tested for the subsequent 132 
months from 1/77 to 12/87. Table 6.4 shows the results of our model during hold out 
sample period (1977-1987). These results are similar to the in-sample results. The 
terminal wealth attained by strategy 4 is 25% greater than that attained by the B &: 
H strategy.7 Strategy 3 outperformed the B & H strategy on a gross profit basis but 
the terminal wealth attained by strategy 3 is 50% lower than that attained by the B 
& H strategy on a net profit basis. These results confirm the idea that we should not 
in the equity and bond portfolio based on its trading experience [Vandell and Stevens [158]]. Atchley 
and Ehrhardt [4] also employed transactions costs of .25 percent. We also plan to compare results 
with one and .25 percent transaction cost. 
6The terminal wealth attained by strategy 4-1 is 57 % greater than that attained by strategy 2. 
7As we can see from the Figure 6.4, the terminal wealth by strategy 4 is 3.8% greater than that 
attained by B k H strategy until 1986 before the stock market crash. But the terminal wealth by 
strategy 4-1 is consistently 20% greater than that attained by the B & H strategy even before the 
stock market crash and its aftermath. 
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Table 6.3 Summary of Results for Investment Analysis ( In-sample) 
Commission Strategy Beginning Wealth Ending Wealth Rate of Return 
0 % 1 $ 10,000 $ 20,626 4.9448 % 
B k H S 27,847 7.0661 % 
3 $ 77,688 21.1848 % 
4 S 58,872 12.5453 % 
4-1 S 43,678 10.3276 % 
5 $ 25,775 6.5156 % 
1 % 1 $ 10,000 $ 20,626 4.9448 % 
B & H $ 27,574 6.9958 % 
3 $ 51,560 11.5546 % 
4 $ 53,684 11.8802 % 
4-1 $ 40,583 9.7884 % 
5 $ 25,623 6.4736 % 
2 % 1 $ 10,000 $ 20,626 4.9448 % 
B & H $ 27,301 6.9248 % 
3 $ 34,077 8.5169 %a 
4 $ 48,931 11.1661 %b 
4-1 S 37,696 9.2496 %c 
5 $ 25,470 6.4311 % 
“number of transactions : 41 
^number of transactions : 61 
“number of transactions : 55 
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attempt to make frequent shifts in portfolio mix based on modest change in market 
risk environment especially when we consider transaction costs. Those shift will add 
value only when we have a high degree of confidence in our assessment of the risk 
environment, of the following periods. Figure 6.6 and 6.7 show probabilities of market 
risk and allocations of funds during hold-out sample period (1977-1987), respectively. 
Figure 6.3 illustrates investment results for six strategies in terms of the growth of a 
dollar during 1/62-12/76. As the figure indicates, strategy 3, 4, and 4-1 outperformed 
strategy 1, 2, and 5. Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 show the hold-out results and whole 
sample results. 
As we mentioned in Chapter 4, we also test the model using OLS. The multiple 
regression results are contained in Table 6.5. The overall results are generally accept¬ 
able, since all the R2 are significant at the .01 level and the Durbin-Watson (D-W) 
statistics that measure serial correlation in the residual are in the acceptable range. 
We pick the following timing prediction model (Model 1): 
ERi = - 0.03 - 21.93 x DTB - 10.37 x PTB 4- .02 x DP - .57 x ERNG 
Table 6.6 and 6.7 contains comparative results for a model based on probabilities 
and a model based on OLS. The model using OLS has better performance than the 
models using logit analysis and strategy 2 during the within sample period with 1% 
transaction cost and without transaction costs while the model using logit analysis 
has better performance than the model using OLS with 2% transaction costs. On the 
other hand, that model using OLS has far worse performance than strategy 4 and 
4-1 using logit analysis during hold out sample period with and without transaction 
costs. These results imply that investment timing may depend more on a proper 
forecast of the direction than of the magnitude of risk environment and logit analysis 
may be superior in generating probabilities of risk environment as compared to OLS. 
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Table 6.4 Summary of Results for Investment Analysis(Hold-Out Sample) 
Commission Strategy Beginning Wealth Ending Wealth Rate of Return 
0 % 1 $ 10,000 $ 25,278 8.7960 % 
B & H $ 38,369 13.0028 % 
3 S 44,688 10.4959 % 
4 $ 58,437 17.4083 % 
4-1 S 53,620 16.4937 % 
5 S 33,696 11.6765 % 
1 % 1 $ 10,000 $ 25,278 8.7960 % 
B & H $ 37,966 12.8944 % 
3 $ 30,047 10.5189 % 
4 $ 52,359 16.2419 % 
4-1 S 49,211 15.5885 % 
5 $ 33,488 11.6136 % 
2 % 1 $ 10,000 $ 25,278 8.7960 % 
B & H $ 37,562 12.7846 % 
3 $ 20,123 6.5635 %“ 
4 $ 46,787 15.0590 %b 
4-1 $ 45,139 14.6845 %c 
5 $ 33,280 11.5504 % 
“number of transactions : 39 
bnumber of transactions : 48 
“number of transactions : 39 
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Table 6.5 OLS results 
Model 1 
Coefficient 
2 
Coefficient 
3 
Coefficient 
4 
Coefficient 
5 
Coefficient 
Constant 
(T-ratio) 
-.0291 
(-1.444) 
-.0027 
(-.048) 
-.0155 
(-1.101) 
-.0363 
(-1.830) 
-.0385 
(-.784) 
DTB 
(T-ratio) 
-21.9347 
(-4.236)***“ 
-20.4895 
(-3.866)*** 
-20.6762 
(-3.903)*** 
-22.7763 
(-4.370)*** 
-22.3903 
(-4.288)*** 
PTB 
(T-ratio) 
-10.3681 
(-3.687)*** 
-12.5184 
(-3.594)*** 
-10.8308 
(-3.577)*** 
BMA 
(T-ratio) 
2.8950 
(3.115)*** 
3.4681 
(2.484)**6 
DP 
(T-ratio) 
.0228 
(3.307)*** 
.0264 
(3.554)*** 
.0240 
(3.446)*** 
G 
(T-ratio) 
-1.2263 
(-2.173)** 
-1.3835 
(-2.975)** 
.4175 
(.862) 
ERNG 
(T-ratio) 
-.5718 
(-1.427) 
Cl 
(T-ratio) 
-.0002 
(-.342) 
.00003 
(.078) 
EP 
(T-ratio) 
-.1866 
(-.554) 
Adjusted R2 .1749 .1423 .1433 .1688 .1653 
D-W 2.0548 2.0457 2.0747 2.0586 2.0353 
“’’’Significant at 1 percent level 
b’’Significant at 5 percent level 
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Table 6.6 Comparison between Logit analysis and OLS (In-Sample) 
Commission Strategy Beginning Wealth Ending Wealth Rate of Return 
0 % B & H S 10,000 $ 27,847 7.0661 % 
Logit 4 $ 58,872 12.5453 % 
Logit 4-1 $ 43,678 10.3276 % 
OLS $ 66,753 13.4919 % 
1 % B & H $ 10,000 $ 27,574 6.9958 % 
Logit 4 $ 53,684 11.8802 % 
Logit 4-1 $ 40,583 9.7884 % 
OLS $ 59,793 12.6618 % 
2 % B & H $ 10,000 $ 27,301 6.9248 % 
Logit 4 S 48,931 11.1661 % 
Logit 4-1 S 37,696 9.2496 % 
OLS S 46,915 10.8547 % 
Table 6.7 Comparison between Logit analysis and OLS (Hold-Out Sample) 
Commission 
0 % 
Strategy 
B & H 
Logit 4 
Logit 4-1 
OLS 
Beginning Wealth 
$ 10,000 
Ending Wealth 
$ 38,369 
$ 58,437 
$ 53,620 
$ 49,810 
Rate of Return 
13.0028 % 
17.4083 % 
16.4957 % 
15.7157 % 
1 % B k H 
Logit 4 
Logit 4-1 
OLS 
$ 10,000 $ 37,966 
$ 52,359 
$ 49,211 
$ 39,860 
12.8944 % 
16.2419 % 
15.5885 % 
13.3951 % 
2 % B k H 
Logit 4 
Logit 4-1 
OLS 
$ 10,000 $ 37,562 
$ 46,787 
$ 45,139 
S 30,304 
12.7841 % 
15.0590 % 
14.6845 % 
10.6045 % 
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Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.9 show the performance of the model using logit analysis 
and the model using OLS. 
Table 6.8 contains a summary of the results for several strategies in terms of 
monthly rates of return (arithmetic and geometric) and standard deviation of the 
monthly returns when we assess 2% transactions costs. 
These results strongly support our timing model (especially strategy 4) compared 
to B & H strategy. Not only is the monthly rate of return substantially higher 
(i.e. .76% to 1.02% versus less than 0.26%), but the risk measured by the standard 
deviation is higher for the B & H strategy than for timing models (strategy 4 and 
4-1). This result occurred because timing models evidently avoided a number of the 
adverse impact of major market declines by switching into T-bills. The comparison 
between strategy 5 and strategy 4 is less clear. These results indicate higher rate of 
return for the strategy 4 (0.69% to 1.02% versus less than 0.33%), but the standard 
deviation for strategy is much lower. 
A more relevant way of comparing risk is to look at total performance over a 
cycle. Figure 6.10 and 6.11 show the one-year moving (annualized) performance of 
our model relative to the B & H strategy and strategy 5. Strategy 4 didn’t have a 
worse performance than the B & H strategy except 1985-1986. Especially in the poor 
market years, strategy 4 was distinctly better than the B & H strategy. Figure 6.12 
and 6.13 produce the yearly performance characteristic line for strategy 4 against the 
B H strategy and strategy 5. The portfolio beta of 0.659 indicates a moderately less 
risky portfolio than the market. The alpha of 0.076 per year is statistically significant 
at the .01 level. Figure 6.12 shows a tendency for strategy 4 to do well in bad markets 
and to match the B & H strategy in good markets. Figure 6.13 shows that strategy 
4 outperforms strategy 5 in both strong and weak markets. 
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Table 6.8 Average Monthly Return and Standard Deviation 
Period Strategy Arithmetic Mean Standard Deviation Geometric Mean 
'62-587 1 0.53 % 0.24 % 0.53 % 
2 0.86 % 4.57 % 0.76 % 
3 0.69 % 3.51 % 0.63 % 
4 1.08 % 3.42 % 1.02 % 
4-1 0.99 % 3.81 % 0.92 % 
5 0.73 % 2.74 % 0.69 % 
’62-76 1 0.41 % 0.13 % 0.41 % 
2 0.66 % 4.42 % 0.56 % 
3 0.76 % 3.72 % 0.69 % 
4 0.95 % 3.39 % 0.95 % 
4-i 0.81 % 3.68 % 0.74 % 
5 0.56 % 2.64 % 0.52 % j: 
77-’87 1 0.71 % 0.24 % 0.71 % 
2 1.14 % 4.75 % 1.01 % 
3 0.60 % 3.20 % 0.53 % 
4 1.25 % 3.45 % 1.18 % 
4-1 1.24 % 3.96 % 1.15 % 
5 0.97 % 2.84 % 0.92 % 
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Table 6.9 Results without 1979-1981 
Period Strategy Beginning Wealth Ending Wealth Rate of Return 
’62 - 78 B & H 
4 
S 10,000 $ 26,977 
48,355 
6.0114 % 
9.7111 % 
o
o
 i. 
t- B & H 
4 
9,673 
9,711 
-.0165 % 
-.0145 % 
-3
 
1 oo
 
-4
 
B & H 
4 
25,096 
27,414 
10.7645 % 
11.8571 % 
’82 - 587 B & H 
4 
26,474 
28,230 
17.6170 % | 
18.8827 % 
’62 - ’87 B k H 
4 
69,990 
136,449 
14.9105 % 
20.5228 % 
Strategy 4 has better performance than B H strategy even when we ignore the 
the typical down markets (1979-1981) with 2% transactions costs. Table 6.9 shows 
these results. 
We compared portfolio performance in up and down markets to check whether 
our model works through the cycle. Table 6.10, and Figure 6.14, 6.15, 6.16 show 
these comparison. Strategy 4 did comparatively well relative to the B & H strategy 
in down markets. Strategy 4 did better than the strategy 1 in up markets. It nearly 
matched the B & H strategy under those circumstances. This results show that our 
model can reduce downside risk and improve average performance over a cycle. 
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Table 6.10 Performance Results in Up and Down Markets 
Period Strategy 1 B &: H Strategy Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5 
Up Markets 
8/63-2/65 
10/66-11/68 
7/70-4/71 
10/74-12/76 
3/78-11/80 
8/82-11/83 
6/84-3/86 
Compound Average 
3.28 % 
4.73 % 
3.57 % 
5.64 % 
9.62 % 
8.48 % 
8.37 % 
6.69 % 
19.62 % 
21.34 % 
37.83 % 
35.62 % 
25.43 % 
46.17 % 
34.41 % 
31.02 % 
19.62 % 
16.06 % 
37.83 % 
33.23 % 
11.84 % 
30.69 % 
6.59 % 
20.89 % 
17.80 % 
18.33 % 
35.43 % 
33.18 % 
26.61 % 
41.14 % 
22.92 % 
27.72 % 
12.86 % 
14.59 % 
23.14 % 
23.22 % 
19.21 % 
30.13 % 
23.59 % 
20.99 % 
Down Markets 
2/62-7/63 
3/65-9/66 
12/68-6/70 
5/71-9/74 
1/77-2/78 
12/80-7/82 
12/83-5/84 
4/86-12/87 
Compound Average 
2.80 % 
4.29 % 
6.64 % 
5.23 % 
5.23 % 
14.00 % 
9.42 % 
5.65 % 
6.86 % 
2.36 % 
-5.13 % 
-19.62 % 
-13.90 % 
-13.90 % 
-10.52 % 
-14.28 % 
5.21 % 
-8.64 % 
2.36 % 
-5.46 % 
-21.99 % 
-13.90 % 
-13.90 
7.60 % 
9.42 % 
-4.20 % 
-3.92 % 
1.28 % 
-4.22 % 
-17.20 % 
-13.58 % 
-13.58 % 
10.55 % 
-12.11 % 
5.18 % 
-2.29 % 
2.89 % 
-1.34 % 
-9.68 % 
-6.54 % 
-6.54 % 
-1.21 % 
5.35 % 
6.26 % 
-3.35 % 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Much of previous research in finance has concentrated on explaining movements 
of individual securities rather than on explaining movements in the stock market as a 
whole. Although the available data are limited, the movements in the stock market as 
a whole are extremely important for movements in individual stocks. Indeed, market 
events of the past ten years have sparked an interest in tactical asset allocation. The 
turbulence of October 1987 (the disappointing results of portfolio insurance during 
the Oct. 19, 1987 market crash and the awareness that asset allocation adds value) 
has only accelerated this interest. 
A review of the related literature showed that the returns on the market timer’s 
portfolio increases as the level of information increases and that even a modest amount 
of information can bring substantial advantage. 
This study seeks to develop a methodology that systematically incorporates cur¬ 
rently available information into the tactical asset allocation process. The goal is not 
to predict individual stock prices, or every small movement in the market. Rather 
we would like to use the currently available data to provide the investor with an 
estimate of the probabilities associated with the broad measure of either a “bullish5' 
or “bearish” market period. Our study focused on how state probabilities could be 
generated from the appropriate variables based on theory and utilized in the asset al- 
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location process. This procedure was evaluated to determine if portfolio performance 
was improved over a buy-and-hold strategy. 
7.1 Methodology 
The methodology employed in our study was a three step procedure. The first 
step is to find ex ante observable variables which can predict the excess return. The 
second step involved the generation of state probabilities from a logit analysis of the 
sample data. Appropriate variables based on theory were collected over a 15-year 
time period and used in the development of a logit model for predicting “bullish” and 
“bearish” stock market months. The data were collected with regard to publication 
lag time to ensure that the data would have been available to the investor at the 
beginning of each month. The 180 months were classified as either “bullish” (total 
return on stock, including dividends, exceeded the return on Treasury Bills) or as a 
“bearish” (inverse of a “bullish” market month) months. A dichotomous logit analysis 
using a “0,1” (0 = “bearish”, 1 = “bullish”) coded dependent variable was used to 
analyze the 15-year period. A significant logit model was developed from the data 
relating to the 15-year within sample period. The model was verified with a 11-year 
holdout sample. 
The third step of the procedure used the probabilities generated by the logit 
model to suggest the optimum allocation of funds between two asset classes; a market 
portfolio and a risk free asset. The surrogate for the market portfolio was the S 
P 500 Index. The risk-free asset was represented by U.S. Treasury bills. An asset 
allocation schedule was developed based on the probabilities assigned by the logit 
model. For comparison purposes, several strategies were evaluated. 
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7.2 Findings 
The logit analysis of the sample data produced a statistically significant model 
for predicting bullish’' and “bearish” stock market months. The model correctly 
classified 116 out of the 179 months of the within sample period. The implication of 
a statistically significant model is that the appropriate variables based on theory for 
the within sample period could have been used to objectively predict the probabilities 
of “bullish” and “bearish” market months. The model was verified with a 11-year 
holdout sample period. 
During the within sample period, An asset allocation procedure based on the 
probabilities generated by the verified logit model has shown better performance 
than buy-and-hold S & P 500 Index strategy even when we assess 2% transactions 
costs. These results were confirmed with a holdout sample. Not only is the monthly 
rate of return sub st anti all y higher, but the risk measured by the standard deviation 
is higher for B & H strategy than for timing models. This result occurred because 
timing models avoided a number of the adverse impact of major market declines by 
switching into T-bills. We also find that timing models did comparatively well relative 
to the B &: H strategy in down markets and nearly matched the B & H strategy in up 
markets. These results showed that our model can reduce downside risk and improve 
average performance over a cycle. 
7.3 Conclusion 
Our results have a number of implications for investing and portfolio management. 
First, this study suggest some possibilities that portfolio performance can be im¬ 
proved by successful market timing model. When viewed over time, risks were con¬ 
trolled and returns were enhanced. By timing the extreme markets, lost opportunities 
for gains in bullish markets were more than made up when dramatic downturns oc- 
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curred. This result also confirm other studies that a market timer who follows optimal 
rules can expect higher return and lower risk than a buy-and-hold investor. The re¬ 
sults obtained during hold-out sample period (1977-1987) did not differ significantly 
from the results based on a 15-year in sample period (1962-1976). Thus the benefits 
derived from our timing model appear to be robust-at least in the kind of economic 
environment that characterized the last 30-year in the United States. 
Second, this study shows that readily available information can be used to aid 
the investment manager in assigning probabilities to the future states of the stock 
market. Those probabilities can be effectively used in the asset allocation decision 
process. 
Third, our analysis highlights the importance of transaction costs. Our results 
confirm the idea that we should not attempt to make frequent shifts in portfolio mix 
based on modest change in market risk environment. Those shift will add value only 
when we have a high degree of confidence in our assessment of the risk environment. 
Our analysis using monthly data also point out some possibility that shortening 
the time horizon for timing decision is advantageous. Performance improves as the 
relative volatility of the market return increases - that is, as the length of the timing 
horizon is decreased. But, this effect is limited by several practical considerations. 
The accuracy of predictions is likely to decrease as the time horizon is shortened.1 
Transactions costs definitely will increase as the length of the time horizon decreases 
and thus the number of transactions increases. Both of these influences will limit the 
extent to which shortening the time horizon for timing decision is advantageous. 
Since our model is basically a market timing prediction model, the primary use is 
to aid investment managers in asset allocation decision. Our model is both inexpen- 
1This contention is based on the view that the accuracy of any prediction is reduced by the 
occurrence of unpredictable random events. If these random events are unrelated, then they will 
tend to offset each other over time. Therefore, we might expect their reduction of the accuracy of 
prediction to be smaller, the longer the time horizon over which the prediction is made. 
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sive and easy to use. Input to our model can be obtained readily from public sources 
and classification can be made simply by calculating the probability of bullish (or 
bearish) market months with the model coefficients and comparing it to the optimal 
cutoff probability. Our model is also objective and unambiguous. It does not depend 
on subjective judgement, the probability of bullish market months is determined sta¬ 
tistically, and the prediction rule is clear. Although we can really identify optimal 
cutoff probabilities to minimize the expected costs only when the actual misclassifi- 
cation costs are available, the relatively high number of correct classification in the 
holdout sample indicates that the probabilities generated by the logit model during 
the within sample could be considered as accurate probabilities. 
This study is simplified in several ways. First, it includes only two types of assets; 
stocks and Treasury bills ignoring all other assets such as bond and real estate. This 
concept can also be extended to another asset classes. 
Second, one question that arises naturally in a study such as this is whether addi¬ 
tional ex ante variables have predictive ability. We have chosen to define this study by 
restricting the number of ex ante variables, but the investigation could be extended 
across a range of ex ante variables as well. The lag time of the various independent 
variable observations could also be varied extensively in hopes of obtaining a stronger 
predictive model. 
Third, the linear relationship may not be optimal. A fundamental and widespread 
economic change should affect the structural relationships in the market. The struc¬ 
tural relationships between securities are almost certainly not constant. 
Further studies should include a variation on the time intervals applied in this 
study. For example, weekly variables could be compared to a weekly return on the 
market portfolio. An asset allocation strategy could then be tested to learn if value 
is likely to be created from a weekly adjustment of a portfolio. Another alternative 
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would be to sample quarterly or yearly data based on the premise of adjusting the 
portfolio quarterly or annually. Also, many different variations of the asset allocation 
strategy could be evaluated to achieve the ultimate value from the logit probabilities. 
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